Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1989

Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The
First Fifteen Months
Ilene H. Nagel
Indiana University School of Law

Stephen J. Schulhofer
University of Chicago School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Nagel, Ilene H. and Schulhofer, Stephen J., "Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
The First Fifteen Months" (1989). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2076.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2076

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

NEGOTIATED PLEAS UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THE FIRST FIFTEEN MONTHS

Stephen J. Schulhofer and Ilene H. Nagel*
I.

The Legislative Background .........................................
The Sentencing Commission's Initial Product..................

232
232
232
235
235
242

The "Introduction" .............................................

242

2.
Specific Provisions ..............................................
3.
Summary of the Commission's Approach ................
C. The Justice Department's Guidelines for Prosecutors........

243
250
252
256

INTRODUCTION

A.
B.
II.

.................................................................

The Purpose of the Article ..........................................
Outline of the Article .................................................

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES SYSTEM ....................................

A.
B.

1.

III.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN ......................................................

IV.

PRELIMINARY
PRE-MISTRETTA

FINDINGS: CHANGING THE PLEA PRACTICES IN THE
STAGE OF GUIDELINE INTERPRETATION ...............

A.

Overview ...................................................................

B.

Bargaining Standards and Procedures.....

...............

264

The Initial Charging Decision ................................
Preindictment Contacts with the Defense ................
Substantive Criteria for Plea Negotiation ................
Procedures for Review of Plea Bargains .................

264
264
265
266

Acceptance of Responsibility........................................
Substantial Assistance .................................................
Other Vehicles for Negotiation .....................................

267
268
271

Date Bargaining ..................................................

271

Guideline Factor Bargaining ..................................
Scope of the problem ...................................
a.
Control of fact-bargaining .............................
b.
3.
Charge Bargaining ...............................................
Reasons for Bargaining...............................................
Summary of Research Findings.....................................

272
272
274
278
283
284

1.
2.
3.
4.

C.
D.
E.

1.
2.

F.
G.

260
260

Stephen J. Schulhofer is the Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg Professor and Director of the
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago School of Law. Ilene H.
Nagel is a member of the United States Sentencing Commission and Professor of Law at the
Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). The views expressed in this Article are those of
the individual authors and are not meant to represent the views of the United States Sentencing
Commission. We thank Nicholas Mansfield for research assistance and editorial suggestions and
Albert Alschuler for comments on the manuscript.
*

AMERcAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

V.

FUTURE PROSPECTS .............................................................
I.

[Vol. 27:231

286

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Article

A.

This Article explores the relationship between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and plea negotiation practices during the fifteen month period that preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Mistretta v. United States.' We
conclude that the Guidelines have brought a significant order and consistency
to the prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions that have an effect on
sentencing. This result is particularly remarkable considering the disarray which
characterized the federal system before the Mistretta decision. Having noted
this achievement, it is nevertheless important to recognize the sentencing discretion which remains in prosecutorial hands. If abused and unchecked, this
discretion has the potential to create the disparities that sentencing reform was
intended to prevent.
Our exploratory interview data from four non-randomly selected jurisdictions
suggest that in the majority of cases, even during the pre-Mistretta period,
compliance with the Guideline system was the predominant pattern. However,
the Guidelines were still circumvented in an identifiable minority of cases.
When circumvention occurred, it was accomplished through date bargaining,
charge bargaining, fact bargaining or Guideline factor bargaining. Importantly,
such circumvention contradicted the Guideline structure and specific Guideline
policy.
In the post-Mistretta period, it will be critical to evaluate the impact the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines will have on charging and plea practices. The
interrelationship between sentencing discretion and prosecutorial discretion cannot be ignored when exploring the success of sentencing reform. The data presented here, despite their non-random character, can provide at least some
measure of comparison between the periods before and after Mistretta. Moreover, as observations, they can serve to stimulate the derivation of hypotheses
which may quantitatively be tested when the Guidelines have been fully implemented across the United States. Finally, the discussions presented here set the
stage for future research by explicating the nature of the relationship between
plea negotiation and sentencing under the structure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines which were first promulgated.
B.

Outline of the Article

A new era in federal criminal practice was inaugurated on November 1,
1987, when the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission (the Commission) formally took effect. The Guidelines
unquestionably revolutionize the sentencing process for defendants convicted at
1. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
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trial. The Guidelines' effect on federal charging and plea negotiation practices,
however, may be even more important. 2 Equally important, and especially
mysterious, is the reverse effect that charging and plea negotiation processes
can have on the Guidelines process, and on the overall goals of federal re3
form.
This Article analyzes the interconnections between sentencing and the negotiated plea process within the context of the new federal sentencing system, and
presents an exploratory study of sentences resulting from negotiated plea
agreements formulated during the earliest months of Guideline implementation.
The background of state and federal sentencing in the United States is complex. Although it is acknowledged that plea bargaining poses a major stumbling block to the success of sentencing reform 4 in both the state and federal
2. Some 85% of federal criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. UNTED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N,

SUPPLEMENTARY

REPORT ON

Tim INTAL

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

AND

POLCY

STATEMENTS 48 (June 18, 1987).

3. For one commentator's analysis of the potential impact of plea practice on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, see Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459 (1988) (exhorting judges to use their power to limit adverse effects of
prosecutorial discretion).
The general desirability of plea bargaining has been the subject of exhaustive debate. Some
commentators have argued that plea bargaining is or could become a desirable method of disposition. See, e.g., Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, reprinted in,PRESIDENT'S COMRSSlON ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TAsR FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 112
(1967) (discussing administrative efficiency and maximization of accurate verdicts); P. UTZ, SETTLINo THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIm4AL COURT 127-48 (1978) (discussing inner dynamics of negotiated system of justice); Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice", 13 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 509, 513-16 (1979) (suggesting plea bargaining need not be unfair either to defendant or public).
Others view plea bargaining as unjust in principle, or in its practical effects. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 652 (1981) (arguing plea
bargaining is inherently unfair and irrational process); Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?,
97 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1087-1106 (1984) (offering bench trial model as preferable alternative to
plea bargaining); Schulhofer, No Job Too Small: Justice Without Bargaining in the Lower Criminal Courts, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 519, 582-591 (1985) (arguing plea bargaining is not
inevitable); Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unnecessary Evil, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 615, 618-27 (1987)
(advocating abolition of plea bargaining).
4. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 563-76 (1978) (discussing detrimental effect of prosecutor's extensive power to formulate changes and bargain for guilty
pleas upon success of fixed or presumptive sentencing schemes); Casper & Brereton, Evaluating
Criminal Justice Reforms, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 121, 123-38 (1984) (discussing some major problems involved in analyzing policy implementation); J. Coffee & M. Tonry, Hard Choices: Critical
Trade-offs in the Implementation of Sentencing Reform Through Guidelines, reprinted in REFORM
AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 155, 157-61 (M. Tonry & F. Zimring eds.
1983) (considering problems of eliciting compliance with major changes in substantive sentencing
policies); Church, Plea-Bargains,Concessions and the Courts: Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment, 10
LAW & Soc'y REv. 377, 381-97 (1976) (analyzing potential effect a "no bargain" policy might
have on court systems); Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of PleaBargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 393, 407-24 (1979) (discussing effect of mandatory sentences coupled with policy forbidding plea bargaining).
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systems, few legislative initiatives even addressed this problem.' Washington
appears to be the only jurisdiction that did not fall prey to this lack of legislative directive. The Washington legislature required its Sentencing Commission
to promulgate "prosecuting standards" to prevent the disparities in plea negotiation practice from undermining the uniform application of its guidelines.
are so open-ended 6 that they may leave no
The standards adopted, however,
7
basis for effective review.
A three-year evaluation of the Minnesota experience, published in 1984, concluded that "the power of prosecutors unquestionably increased" after the
guidelines." The study also concluded that even though the overall guilty plea
rate remained unchanged, there was a substantial shift in the form of guilty
plea negotiations. From 1978 to 1982, sentence bargains fell from 60 percent
to 26 percent of all cases, but charge bargains rose from 21 percent to 31
percent of all cases. 9 This change indicates a shift to a form of bargaining
which is not subject to Guideline controls on disparity. The extent of this shift
depended heavily on the policies followed by individual district attorneys. In
Minnesota's largest county, for example, changes in the form of plea negotiations were minimal, but in the second-largest county, sentence negotiations
0
"almost disappeared," with the rate of charge bargaining tripling.
A 1987 study of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines showed an increase
in the frequency of convictions involving the dropping of counts and the reduction of offense seriousness levels, as compared to the pre-guidelines period." This decrease in the offense seriousness levels of charges and
convictions was more significant in urban areas than in rural areas. Since
guideline severity levels were likely to be more severe than past practice in
urban jurisdictions, this finding indicates that plea practices in urban areas
severity levels that
had been altered as a means of circumventing guideline
2
were intended to apply uniformly across the state.'
5. See RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFoRM I (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S.
Martin & M. Tonry eds. 1983) (collection of essays evaluating guidelines system); Alschuler, supra
note 4, at 551 (sentencing reform will not be effective without way to check prosecutorial discretion); McCoy, Determinate Sentencing, Plea Bargaining Bans, and Hydraulic Discretion in Califor-

nia, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 256, 272-74 (1984) (evaluating effect of determinate sentencing and plea
bargaining limitation on prison overcrowding); S. Verdun, Jones & D. Cousineau, The Impact of
Plea Bargaining Upon the Implementation of Sentencing Reform (Nov. 13-16, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript).
6. See WASH. REV. CODE

§§

9.94A .430 to 9.94A .460 (1989) (recommending prosecuting

standards for Sentencing Reform Act of 1981).
ING

7. See, e.g., D. BOERNER, SENTENCING
REFORM ACT OF 1981 (1985).

IN WASHINGTON:

8. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N,
GUIDELINES: TmE YEAR EVALUATION 71 (1984).

THE

A

LEGAL ANALYSIS

OF THE SENTENC-

IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING

9. Id. at 72.
PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: Tim EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1988).
11. R. LuBrrz & C. KEMPINEN, THE IMPACT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
AN ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM ADJUSTMENTS TO SENTENCING REFORM 5 (1987).

10. Id. See generally D.

12. Id. at 7.
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The federal Guidelines system, in contrast, includes a unique package of
rules and practices intended to address the problem of prosecutorial discretion.
Its effort to regulate the guilty plea process is more ambitious and aggressive
than anything attempted or even imagined at the state level. Yet, by any absolute standard, the federal effort is itself quite cautious and incomplete." This
Article attempts to describe the contours of the federal approach to this vexing problem, and to assess its results during the initial period of partial
Guideline implementation.
Part I briefly describes the structure and goals of federal sentencing reform,
and acknowledges the concern that negotiated pleas might subvert the goals of
sentencing reform. Part I then outlines the actions taken by Congress, the
United States Sentencing Commission and the Justice Department in reaction
to the potential difficulties these institutions perceived. Part II describes the
methodology employed to investigate anticipated and unanticipated effects of
early plea negotiation practices under the Guidelines. Part III presents the
findings of this exploratory research, while Part IV speculates about future
prospects and discusses our conclusions.
Federal sentencing reform, even during this early period, has succeeded in
bringing considerable order and consistency to prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions that have implications for sentencing. Nonetheless, the sentencing discretion that remains in prosecutorial hands, for practical purposes,
is enormous. The important but incomplete plea bargaining restrictions written
into the first iteration of the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines 4 ultimately
may be inadequate to guide the sentencing aspects of the discretion prosecutors have in charging and bargaining. Apart from the deficiencies in these plea
bargaining restrictions, the limited restrictions themselves are sometimes disregarded in practice. In Part V we elaborate on these conclusions and discuss
possible remedies for the problems discovered in the course of our preliminary
research.
II.

THE SENTENCING GUMELINES SYSTEM
A.

The Legislative Background

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing
Commission, an independent agency in the judicial branch, and instructed the
Commission to promulgate guidelines for federal judges to use while imposing
criminal sentences. The statute contains general guidance about the construction of the guidelines, along with many specific directives for dealing with
particular issues.'" In general, the statute contemplates that the Commission
13. See infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text (discussing sentencing under new federal
Guidelines).
14. UNITED STATES SENTENCING Comm'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 6B1.1 - 6BI.4 (Nov. 1, 1987)
[hereinafter GUIDELNES].

15. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988).
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will establish categories of offenses and offenders, and that it will set a narrow range of sentences for each combination of offense and offender characteristics. Where the guidelines call for imprisonment, the statute prescribes that
the maximum term of imprisonment cannot exceed the minimum set by the
guidelines by more than 25 percent or six months, whichever is greater. 16 This
mandate dictates that similarly situated offenders convicted of similar offenses
should have imprisonment sentences that differ by no more than 25 percent.
This limitation sets the parameters of acceptable disparity within the guideline
system. Moreover, although the statute theoretically leaves the Commission
with freedom to determine the amount of reliance on these general categories,
the 25 percent limitation on the width of the guideline range in practice leaves
the Commission obliged to use rather refined distinctions, and to develop detailed offense and offender categories."
The statute connects the Commission's guidelines to actual sentencing decisions by imposing constraints on judicial sentencing discretion for the first
time. The judge is no longer free to select any sentence within a very wide
range typically authorized by federal criminal statutes." The judge is also prohibited from imposing a sentence without giving reasons for the decision, since
he must explicitly state his reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 19 Under
the Sentencing Reform Act, the judge is required to determine, on the basis of
a combination of the offense and offender characteristics, the applicable
guideline range. He is instructed next to select a sentence from within that
range, unless there are aggravating or mitigating factors that were not adequately considered by the Commission in formulating the guidelines and which
justify a sentence other than that which the guidelines prescribe.20 Moreover,
the identification of the applicable guideline and the decision whether to de2
part from it are both made subject to appellate review. '
16. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
17. By contrast, the statutory categories are generally quite broad. The federal bank robbery
statute, for example, encompasses
[wlhoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association

..

."

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). This definition makes no accomodation for several relevant sentencing factors, including whether the perpetrator carried and/or used a weapon, the degree of planning involved, whether and to what degree personal injury resulted from the robbery, and the amount of
property taken.
18. The federal bank robbery statute authorizes imprisonment from anywhere between zero and
20 years. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). The judge must provide reasons for the imposition of a particular
sentence if he or she departs from the guideline range, or if the sentence is within the range but
that range exceeds two years. Id.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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One additional facet of sentencing discretion is addressed in the Sentencing
Reform Act. Prior to the Act, federal offenders sentenced to prison served
terms set by the judge, but these terms were later adjusted by the United
States Parole Commission, in the exercise of its function of determining when
prisoners could be released on parole. The Parole Commission had developed
its own guidelines for setting release dates. In practice, many offenders served
only about one-third of the term imposed by the judge.2 2 The Sentencing Reform Act abolished early release on parole, shifting entirely to a real time
system. With the exception of a modest potential for sentence reduction attributable to the defendant's good behavior, 23 the sentence pronounced under the
new Federal Sentencing Guidelines is the time to-be fully served.
The overriding goal of this reform was to reduce unwarranted disparities in
the federal sentencing process. 24 Congress had seen compelling evidence of
25
wide variation in the punishments imposed on similarly situated offenders.
The variations occurred not only from one district to another, but also among
judges within a single district, and sometimes among similar cases sentenced
by the same judge. 2 These disparities not only fostered undue optimism
among offenders who hoped to "beat the rap," they also undermined deterrence and crime control objectives. At the same time, disparities fed prisoner
resentment and impeded rehabilitation.27 In addition, much of the public saw
disparity as simply unfair, especially when disparity was synonymous with discrimination on the basis of sex, race or social class. 28 Liberals and conservatives in Congress agreed, 29 though for different reasons,10 that discretion must
be controlled and unwarranted disparities reduced or eliminated. The Act
22. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4163, 4164 & 4205 (repealed 1984) (good conduct credits and parole
eligibility after serving one-third of court-imposed sentence).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).
24. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983).
25. Id. at 41-50.
26. See generally Austin & Williams, A Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated Legal Cases:

Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CaA. L. C. & P. S. 306 (1977); Diamond & Zeisel,
Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentencing Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 109
(1975); A. PARTRIDo & W.B. ELDRI GE, THE SEcoNiD Cmcurr SENTENcINo STUDY, A REPORT TO
THE JuDGES

(1974); Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New York, 45

N.Y.S. B.J. 163 (1973).

27. The official report on the 1971 Attica prison riots in New York indicates that uncertainty
of release dates was a major cause of the riots. VON HmscHI, Domo JusTcE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNtsHmENTS 31 nll (1976) (citing NEW YORK SPECIAL. COmIUsSIoN ON ATTICA, ATTICA (1972)).
28. See generally Nagel & Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court
Sanctions, 4 CRiME & JusT. 91 (1983); Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUD. 121
(1975); Hopkins, Is There Class Bias in Criminal Sentencing?, 42 Am. Soc. REv. 176 (1977).

29. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was co-sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy, a
liberal Democrat, and Strom Thurmond, a conservative Republican. Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 98 Stat. 3220 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3551).

30. Liberals viewed judicial sentencing discretion as a vehicle for invidious discrimination, while
conservatives sought to curtail what they perceived to be inadequate sentences meted out by a
liberal judiciary.
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passed by a vote of 316 to 91 in the House, and 91 to 1 in the Senate. 3'
Despite good intentions, Congress' plan to reduce these disparities contained
one crucial gap. Congress had eliminated parole release discretion, and had
dramatically curtailed judicial sentencing discretion. Prosecutorial discretion,
however, remained. Sentences would be set uniformly and predictably on the
basis of the applicable offense and offender categories as defined in the guidelines. However, the prosecutor's charging and plea negotiation decisions could
determine these offense and offender categories32 - especially if the guideline
system was tied to the offense for which the defendant was convicted. In the
absence of procedures to assure uniformity and factual accuracy in prosecutorial bargaining practices, disparity could continue. While the Commission and
the judges would tailor the sentence to the supposed offense, in reality, the
prosecutor could tailor the supposed offense to the desired sentence. If this
occurred, disparity, dishonesty, and pockets of excessive leniency would remain.
Concern that plea bargaining could thwart the goals of sentencing reform
surfaced early in the congressional debates. Virtually no one denied the existence of the problem. Yet, there were two schools of thought about its significance. One maintained that, at worst, plea bargaining might initially limit the
gains to be realized by sentencing reform. 3 Reform would produce unequivocal improvement in cases sentenced after trial. It would also encourage uniformity in guilty plea cases by making post-trial punishments more predictable,
and the bargaining parameters clearer. On this basis; incrementalists (and perhaps others who saw plea bargaining as a protection against potentially severe
guideline sentences) favored tackling the relatively manageable issue of judicial
sentencing discretion first, and addressing the guilty plea process later. They
reform hostage to the potentially intractable
did not want to hold sentencing
34
problems of plea bargaining.
Those adhering to the other school of thought were more pessimistic. While
incrementalists assumed that guidelines sentencing might somewhat mitigate the
extant problems, or at worst leave them unaffected, those in this second
school of thought argued that sentencing reform could actually increase the
extent of unwarranted sentencing disparities for defendants convicted by plea.3
Even before sentencing reform, prosecutors enjoyed vast discretion to manipulate charges and to structure plea agreements. 6 The powers of the judge
31. See Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS, 98 Stat. 3182-3717 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551) (legislative history).

32. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 4, at 573.
33. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT 26-27 (1976).

34. Id.
35. See generally Alsehuler, Departures and Plea Agreements, supra note 3; ZsRINo, A CONFIT THE CRH&E, HASTING CENTER REPORT , INsTrIu'r oF SoctExY, ETmcs & LIFE SCIENCES 16 (1976).
SUMER's GUIDE TO SENTENCING REFORM: MAKING THE PUNISHMENT

36. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) ("Iwlhether to prosecute
and what charge to file or bring before the grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the

prosecutor's discretion").
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and the Parole Commission could, however, temper the sentencing consequences of this discretion. In the past, a pyramid of authority forced the sentencing decisions of numerous prosecutors to be reviewed by several hundred
federal sentencing judges, with the sentences imposed by these judges later reviewed by the Parole Commission. A new, decentralized system could leave
sentencing to the virtually unreviewable, invisible discretion of thousands of
relatively autonomous Assistant United States Attorneys. An increase in disparity for cases resolved by a negotiated guilty plea could overwhelm any reduction in disparity for cases resolved by trial. This potential prompted
Professor Franklin Zimring to muse 37that, with respect to sentencing, three discretions might be preferable to one.
In response to these concerns, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) began a
study in 1978 to assess the validity of the incrementalists' hopes and the pessimists' fears. 8 The FJC study stressed two points. First, guilty pleas and plea
bargaining have a significant impact on the sentence imposed in federal criminal cases. Second, the sentencing judge decides the extent of this impact 3 9
The sources of judicial control over guilty plea sentencing were a function
of the different forms of plea agreements available under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Bargains for a specific sentence under Rule
11(e)(1)(C) give maximum sentencing control to the litigants, but, as Judge
Jon Newman has pointed out, such plea agreements were very rare in the federal system 40 Many judges made clear that such bargains should not even be
attempted in their courts, absent unusual circumstances. Many courts also expressed disfavor with bargains involving a recommended sentence. Where such
bargains were used, however, judges frequently followed the recommended
sentence, suggesting an important de facto sentencing role for the prosecutors.
The actual distribution of sentencing influence in such instances was complex, since judges could easily and lucidly convey their sentencing expectations,
and prosecutors in a given court usually would not agree to recommend a
sentence that they knew the judge would reject.4 1 Probably the most common
form of plea agreement was the charge bargain. Although plea negotiation and
unilateral prosecutorial charging discretion played central roles in determining
the charges to which a guilty plea would be entered, the authorized terms of
imprisonment under most federal penal statutes are so broad that, for practical purposes, a charge reduction plea agreement rarely constrained the judge's
ability to consider all the background circumstances of the "real offense," and
to set an appropriate sentence accordingly.4 2 In short, the single most important feature of the plea agreement process in federal courts, prior to the Fed37. See generally Zimring, Principles of Criminal Sentencing, Plain and Fancy, 82 Nw. U.L.
REv. 73 (1987).

38. S. SCHIUIHOFER, PROSECUTORA. DIScRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM, REPORT FOR
THE FEDERAL JUICIA. CENTER (August 1979) [hereinafter FJC REPORT].
39.
40.
29, 32
41.
42.

Id.at 8-13.
Newman, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Risk Worth Taking, 5 THE
(1987).
FJC REPORT, supra note 38, at 10-11.
Id.at 10.
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eral Sentencing Guidelines, was the judge's principal role of fixing the sentence
after the guilty plea.
This finding had important implications for the debate between incrementalists and pessimists. It suggested that sentencing reform might not reduce discretion, but instead transfer discretion from judges to prosecutors, the latter
being uniformly younger and less experienced. 43 Moreover, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion would be less visible, and would, at best, be subject
only to supervision within each office. The formal review the Parole Commission provided for the length of prison sentences in the pre-Guidelines system
would be lost. Disparity would be more difficult to detect and less amenable
to correction by judges and the Parole Commission. The FJC Report heightened Congressional concern that, without attention to plea bargaining, sentencing reform could actually increase disparities in the federal sentencing process.
The FJC Report, however, did not recommend preserving the status quo. It
argued that the goals of reform could be achieved if the pending bills were
amended to provide constraints on both judicial and prosecutorial discretion."
45
The Report also suggested a mechanism for implementing this solution.
Previous critics of plea bargaining had urged reliance upon in-house prosecutorial guidelines for the charging and bargaining process.4 The FJC Report
rejected this approach as intrinsically amorphous and unworkable.4 7 Instead,
the Report proposed that the newly constituted United States Sentencing Commission be required to promulgate guidelines for the judge to use in deciding
whether to accept a guilty plea."8 Central to the Report's analysis was its suggestion that efforts to contain the effects of plea bargaining should shift their
focus from prosecutorial discretion, which eludes effective and legitimate outside regulation, to judicial discretion, which is inherent in a court's decision
whether to accept or reject a plea agreement.4 9 The Report noted that this
judicial discretion under Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would become the locus of effective sentencing authority in a reformed
sentencing system.3 0 The Report proposed that this discretion should also be
structured by guidelines.51
43. Id. at 1-3.
44. Id. at 5-7.
45. Id. at 114-32.
46. See, e.g., Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.

J. 651, 678-83 (1976) (legislatures should require prosecutors to issue public guidelines on charging
policy); Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 U.C.L.A.

L. Rav. 1, 28 (1971) ("feasible and desirable" for prosecutors to develop policy statements); Kuh,
Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48,

61 (1975) (District Attorney's memorandum outlining guidelines); White, A Proposal for Reform
of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. R-v. 439, 453-62 (1971) (suggesting creation of
"executive prosecutors" to negotiate plea bargains, with discretion limited by detailed guidelines).
47. FJC REPORT, supra note 38, at 47-48.
48. Id. at 114-32.
49. Id. at 5, 48-49.

50. Id. at 123. In a study of judicial participation in the plea negotiation process in North
Carolina state courts, Professor Allen Anderson found that the implementation of determinate
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Shortly after receiving the FJC Report, the Senate Judiciary Committee responded directly by amending the pending legislation to incorporate the ap2
proach developed in the FJC Report, with only slight modification. The
amendment, which became section 994(a)(2)(E), states that the Commission
shall promulgate "general policy statements regarding ... the appropriate use
of . . . the authority granted under [Rlule 11 (e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant
to [Rlule 11(e)(1)." The legislative history illustrates that both the House and
Senate viewed this provision as crucial to the success of the sentencing reform
effort. Indeed, this provision reflects Congress' express rejection of the incrementalist view. Citing the FJC Report and its concern that guidelines could
"simply shift discretion from judges to prosecutors," and enable prosecutors
to "use the plea bargaining process to circumvent the guidelines," '53 the principal Committee Report on the legislation singles out section 994(a)(2)(E) for
special attention in its short introductory discussion of the bill.54 The Report
notes that under this provision the Commission is "directed to issue policy
statements for consideration by Federal judges in deciding whether to accept a
plea agreement," and states that "[tihis guidance will assure that judges can
examine plea agreements to make certain that prosecutors have not used plea
bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines." 55
sentencing in the state was a factor which prompted some judges to take a more active role in
plea bargain discussions. Anderson, Judicial Participation in the Plea Negotiation Process: Some
Frequencies and Disposing Factors, 10 HAmmimE J. PuB. L. & Poi'Y 39, 54-57 (1989). In North
Carolina, judicial participation in plea discussions is expressly authorized by statute. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A.1021(a) (1989). Such an active judicial role is prohibited in federal courts. FED. R.
Caim. P. 11(e)(l). Nevertheless, the importance of judicial oversight of plea agreements in a determinate sentencing realm cannot be overemphasized. As Anderson notes,
[w]hat can be said with certainty at this juncture is that active judges place themselves in a posture that allows them to better scrutinize the actions of the prosecution. Without this scrutiny, prosecutorial discretion is, by-and-large, unchecked.
Certainly the vast majority of cases go unchallenged by the more active judges, but
at least the appropriateness of the bargained disposition has been validated - the
proper check and balance has been exercised.

10 HmaL rE J.PuB. L. & PoL'Y at 57.
51. FJC REPORT, supra note 38, at 123.
52. The Judiciary Committee incorporated the FJC Report recommendations by issuing a directive to the Commission to promulgate policy statements governing the use of Rule 11 (e)(2) to
regulate plea agreements as opposed to guidelines. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 167. The
shift in mandate to the Commission - to write policy statements rather than guidelines - reflected a slight weakening of resolve, because guidelines are binding on the courts and policy
statements are not. It was not, however, a compromise that automatically portended a weak solution. Indeed, the Committee report states that its addition of section 994(a)(2)(E) to the statute
"is intended to implement" the proposal of the FJC Report. Id.
53. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 63.
54. Id. In the version of the bill discussed in the Committee Report, the provision relating to
plea agreements was denominated section 994(a)(2)(D). It appears as section 994(a)(2)(E) in the
current statute.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Sentencing Commission's Initial Product

The Guidelines Manual published by the Commission in April 1987 and put
into effect in November 1987 deals with the guilty plea process in both its
general "Introduction" (Chapter One), and in its more specific guidelines and
policy statements (Chapter Six). We will discuss the general and specific treatments separately, since they are not entirely consistent.
1. The "Introduction"
The Commission's introductory chapter, in what may be the most important
sentence of the Guidelines Manual relating to this issue, states: "The Commisin generil, make sigsion has decided that these initial [G]uidelines will not,
'5 6
nificant changes in current plea agreement practices."
The decision to defer attention to the plea bargaining problem in the first
edition of the Commission's Guidelines seems at odds with section 994(a)(2)(E)
of Title 28 of the United States Code and Congress' direct rejection of the
incrementalist view. Both the 1984 Act and its legislative history reflect Congress' conclusion that a failure to structure the judge's plea acceptance decision simultaneously with other aspects of the sentencing process would
aggravate the disparity problem. As section 994(a)(2)(E) indicates, Congress expected the Commission to promulgate policy statements regulating the plea acceptance process, along with its initial set of Guidelines. Nonetheless, the
Commission's cautious, judicious approach, as articulated in the Introduction
to the Guidelines, may reflect a well-reasoned accommodation to the enormity
of the task itfaced,57 the short time allocated for the drafting of the first
Guidelines, the storm of controversy awaiting the Guidelines from judges, defense attorneys and other constituent groups, and the knowledge the Commission could acquire if it waited for additional experiential data to become
available. The Commission also may not have wanted to risk losing the support of the Justice Department and its cadre of United States Attorneys before
Congressional adoption of its first Guidelines was assured. 5
The basic problem, however, runs deeper, since the maintenance of preGuideline plea agreement practices may be impossible. What precisely is the
status quo that the Commission cautiously chose to leave undisturbed? Before
the Guidelines, plea agreement practices had two salient features. First, the
prosecutor, in agreement with the defense, specified the offense of conviction
and the relevant background circumstances relating to this offense. This al56. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 1.8.
57. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 883, 913-39 (1990); Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsi'RA L. REv. 1, 8-14, 18-20, 28-31 (1988).
58. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress had six months to approve the
Guidelines after their submission b-y the Sentencing Commission. Pub. L. No. 99-413, tit. 11, c.
II,sec. 235(a)(1) (1984). Given the proposed bill to delay implementation of the initial Guidelines
while votes were curried to rescind the enabling legislation, it may have been critical for the Commission to keep the support of the Attorney General and the Justice Department.
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9
lowed relatively unrestricted party control over the facts and the charges.
Second, the trial judge retained great discretion to tailor the punishment to all
the facts of the case. There was judicial control over the sentence. These practices constituted the status quo prior to the Guidelines .6
How does one preserve this status quo in the context of the Guidelines sentencing system? Paradoxically, it cannot be preserved. In a guidelines system,
whoever controls the relevant facts and charges controls the sentence. One
cannot simultaneously have party control over the facts and charges, and judicial control over the sentence. As a result,- upsetting the status quo is unavoidable. Either judges will no longer set sentences in guilty plea cases, or
prosecutors will no longer control the relevant facts and charges without judicial oversight. The seemingly sensible and attractive notion of preserving the
status quo turns out to be an unrealizable aspiration.
The Commission itself was of at least two minds about the notion of preserving the status quo. 61 While the Introduction to the Guidelines speaks of
preserving the status quo, 62 the more specific portions of the Guidelines Manual, especially Chapter Six, seek to make many significant changes in plea
agreement practices. In one sense, the general theme sounded in the Introduction is simply out of touch with the directives included in the content of the
Manual itself. In another sense, however, the Introduction perfectly captures
the Commission's ambivalence as to which features of the status quo to preserve, and how far to go toward extensive reform in its first Guideline iteration. This ambivalence surfaces again in many of the more specific provisions.
This inconsistent response reflects the kind of compromise which is common
in legislative schemes.

2.

Specific Provisions

Five sets of Guideline provisions are particularly relevant to the problem of
negotiated plea agreements. They are the provisions relating to acceptance of
responsibility (section 3E1.1), substantial assistance (section 5K1.1), the offense
of conviction (sections 2A1.L to 2X5.1), the other offense circumstances
(Chapters 2-3) and the plea acceptance procedures (section 6B1.1-1.4).
Acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines afford no automatic discount
for the guilty plea. However, section 3E1.I provides for a reduction of the
offense severity by two levels, "[ilf the defendant clearly demonstrates a rec59. In theory, additional information might surface in the presentence report. Probation officers, however, relied heavily on prosecutors to provide information about the offense, and Rule
32 permitted defendants, with the court's permission, to waive the presentence report. FED. R.
CRIm. P. 32 (c)(l).
60. See generally FJC REPORT, supra note 38, at 8-13.

61. Given the fact that the Commission is a seven member, bipartisan body comprised of
judges and non-judges, lawyers and non-lawyers, social scientists and non-social scientists, academics and practitioners, incrementalists and pessimists, it is surprising that only two perspectives are
reflected.
62. GurDELINES, supra note 14, at 1.8.
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ognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal

conduct.'

'63

A question arises as to whether this provision constitutes a guilty plea discount. The Guideline is explicit that "[a] defendant may be given consideration under this section without regard to whether his conviction is based upon
a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury."" Conversely, a defendant who pleads guilty is "not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this
section as a matter of right. ' 65 A cynic might dismiss these caveats as smoke
screens designed to avoid the constitutional questions that could result from
making the guilty plea discount explicit."6 Alternatively, these qualifications
and disclaimers may reflect another compromise among reasonable persons of
diverse views. Regardless, these qualifications and disclaimers exist. If trial
judges do take them seriously, by granting the discount to defendants convicted at trial or by denying it to defendants who plead guilty, plea practices,
and especially the incentive to forgo trial, may be greatly affected.
A second important question relates to the size of the acceptance of responsibility discount: how important is a reduction of "two levels"? When a defendant is charged with a level forty offense (with a sentence range of 24 1/2
to 30 1/2 years), a two-level reduction to level thirty-eight (with a sentence
range of 19 1/2 to 24 1/2 years) may not seem like a significant reduction or
a momentous inducement. To understand the implications of a two-level reduction, however, it is necessary to appreciate the way the Commission constructed the Guideline ranges.
Generally, each offense level provides a 25 percent spread in the range of
authorized prison terms. There is approximately a 12.5 percent increase in the
maximum and minimum of each range with each jump of one offense severity
level. 67 As a result, a reduction from offense level twenty to offense level
63.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 14, § 3El.l(a).

64. Id. § 3EL.1(b).
65. Id. § 3E1.1(c) (emphasis added). Some observers have suggested that judges are granting
the acceptance of responsibility discount to a substantial number of defendants adjudicated guilty
after trial. P. Maloney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Remarks before the United States
Sentencing Commission (March 15, 1990) (available at the Commission); J.Brown, United States
Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee, Remarks before the United States Sentencing Commission (March 15, 1990) (available at the Commission). Preliminary data based on a small sample of 59 cases which went to trial lends some support to the testimony of Maloney and Brown,

since between 17 and 32 percent received or may have received the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility after trial (unpublished data available at the Commission).
66. Under United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968), it could be argued that
granting an explicit sentencing discount for pleading guilty constituted an impermissible burden on
the sixth amendment right to trial. However, more recent decisions, especially Corbitt v. New
Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1978), suggest that an explicit guilty plea discount would not be
unconstitutional. For discussion of this problem, see Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 733, 780-86 (1980).
67. At very low offense levels, there are larger jumps. For example, the increase in the minimum of the range from level eight to nine is 100 percent (from two months to four months),
while the increase in the maximum is 25 percent (from eight months to ten months). GUIaELMES,
supra note 14, at 5.2 (Sentencing Table).
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eighteen carries the same approximate percentage reduction in prison exposure
as a reduction from level forty to level thirty-eight. In each case, maximum
exposure is reduced by about 25 percent. The reduction from the maximum of
the higher range (a risk for the defendant who goes to trial) to the minimum
of the reduced range (a reasonable hope for the defendant who pleads guilty)
is approximately 35 percent in both cases. Thus, a reduction of "only" two
levels can be substantial; in fact, the reduction can be as much as 130
months, even for the defendant charged with a level forty offense. 68
The size of the "acceptance" discount on paper may not, however, be equal
to its actual attractiveness to defendants confronted with real world choices.
For a defendant facing the virtual certainty of twenty years in prison without
parole (i.e., the bottom end of the level thirty-eight range), the additional 130
months that could result from conviction after trial may seem like a rather
speculative and incidental disability. The economic concept of discounting to
present value 69 provides one way of thinking about this problem. The psychological impact and physical mortality of the long-term prison population provides another perspective. The defendant may doubt his capacity to survive
even the minimum twenty-year term that he faces under a plea. Under these
circumstances, he may feel he has everything to gain and literally nothing to
lose by taking his chances at trial.
At the lower end of the Guideline table, an analogous problem arises for
the defendant who wants to avoid prison at all costs. If the two-level discount
is inadequate to bring him within the range of offense levels which render
probation or non-traditional confinement a possibility,70 he may feel that he
has no significant incentive to forego trial. In all these respects, the significance of the "acceptance" discount needs to be tested against actual experience.7" '
68. For a level 40 offender with a Category I criminal history, receiving a two level reduction
and the minimum of the lower range results in a reduction of sentence exposure from 365 to 235
months. GTMELUiNS, supra note 14, at 5.2 (Sentencing Table).
69. "Discounting means that the prospect of twenty years' imprisonment is not twice as onerous as the propsect of ten years' imprisonment. If the discount rate is 10 percent, the prospect of
twenty years' imprisonment is twice as serious as the prospect of 5.82 years in jail." Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 294-95 (1983).
70. Probation is a sentencing option, if the minimum term of imprisonment in the range specified by the Sentencing Table is zero months. For an offender in Criminal History Category I, this
would include conduct with a total offense level of six or less. Gumin,Ms, supra note 14, at §

5BI .1.
71. According to the Commission, the decision to set the acceptance of responsibility discount
at 25 to 35 percent reflected the fact that the research staff estimated 25 to 35 percent to be the
average difference between defendants convicted after trial and defendants convicted as a result of
pleading guilty. There may be numerous limitations, however, in using such an estimate. First, the
difference for defendants convicted after trial versus defendants who entered pleas of guilty may
vary by the nature of the offense, the defendant's criminal record, the judge before whom the
defendant appeared, etc. Second, the difference in the sentence between a case that goes to trial
and one that is resolved by a plea will vary greatly, depending on whether the defendant pleads to
the full indictment or to reduced charges. Third, there are a host of other variables (e.g., the
prosecutor's caseload pressure, trial experience and strength of evidence) that may affect the fa-
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Substantial assistance. Guideline section 5Kl.1 provides that "[u]pon motion
of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assisthe court
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
may depart from the [G]uidelines. ' ' 72 Although analytically distinct from sentencing benefits granted in exchange for either a guilty plea or acceptance of
responsibility, the departure for substantial assistance offers a vehicle for
achieving some of the same purposes. The first iteration of the Guidelines,
however, contained no benchmarks for determining the extent of the sentencing reward. Although prosecutors and judges could conceivably develop uniform standards for determining the kind of assistance that warrants departure,
as well as the extent of departure warranted under various circumstances, the
potential for uneven treatment of cooperating defendants is obvious. With the
absence of a definition of substantial assistance, the discretion to make the
motion is unfettered and may vary from prosecutor to prosecutor, jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, and case to case. The substantial assistance departure could
even become a vehicle for avoiding the Guidelines whenever prosecution or
defense has a tactical reason for such circumvention. As an unreviewable motion, the provision opens a potential path to disparity.
The offense. The Guidelines explicitly state that the starting point for determining the offense level is always the formal offense of conviction, not the
"real" offense." Predicating sentencing on the convicted offense can make
prosecutorial charging and charge reduction plea agreements the controlling
step in the sentencing process. It heightens the risk that existing disparities will
be aggravated, unless the exercise of those decisions can be structured and
controlled.
Offense circumstances. Almost all of the offense Guidelines include, along
with a "base offense level" for the offense of conviction, one or more "specific offense characteristics" (i.e., aggravating or mitigating circumstances, such
as use of a weapon, infliction of injury, amounts of property taken), that
produce specified increases or decreases in the applicable offense level. Unlike
the base offense, which is determined by the formal offense of conviction, the
....

vorability of the negotiated plea. An undifferentiated, unweighted average, insensitive to these
sources of variance, may not be consistent with past practice for all cases.
72. Prior to the November 1, 1989 amendment to section SKI.1, the section read as follows:
"Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has made a good faith effort to
. , the court
provide substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
may depart from the Guidelines." UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 5.35
(Oct. 15, 1988).
73. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 1.5-1.6. The Commission wrestled with the problem of

choosing between a "real offense" system and a "charge offense" system. Breyer, supra note 57,
at 8-12; Nagel, supra note 57, at 925-27. Commissioner Paul H. Robinson's July 10, 1986, Guidelines draft provided for a highly detailed system with aggravated punishments for every harm an
offender caused and a corresponding approach for mitigating factors. This "real offense" system
met with widespread criticism and was ultimately rejected by the Commission. The Commission's
final draft was a compromise, employing the offense charged as a base level and modifying that
level with "real" aggravating or mitigating factors. Nagel, supra note 57, at 926; Breyer, supra
note 57, at 11-12.
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specific offense characteristics are determined by the actual offense conduct, as
reflected in the information available to the court.7 4 Thus, prospects for manipulation of the sentence through bargaining are theoretically reduced."
Of course, the court must obtain its information from somewhere. Bargaining over specific offense characteristics could be replaced by bargaining over
stipulations or bargaining over the sources of information to be made available to the court. As a result; if the prosecutor opts not to provide evidence to
support a specific offense characteristic, the judge's hands are tied, despite the
"real offense" principle that governs Guideline determinations. Strategic behavior would simply shift from one form to another, without any change in
the substantive result. The extent of disparity in the process of ascertaining
specific offense characteristics accordingly warrants scrutiny.
Plea agreement procedure. The Guidelines Manual considers guilty plea
practice in several policy statements issued pursuant to section 994(a)(2)(E).
Two policy statements discuss the procedural mechanisms that a judge must
follow when a plea is offered. 76 Another addresses the substantive standards
to accept the plea,17 and a fourth
the judge must use in deciding whether
78
statement discusses factual stipulations.
These provisions establish three important principles. First, factual stipulations must be accurate, complete and not misleading.79 Second, in the case of
plea agreements including a binding or non-binding recommendation to depart
from the applicable Guideline range, a judge may only accept the recommendation if there are "justifiable reasons" for the departure. 0 Third, in the case
of a plea agreement to dismiss charges or to withhold potential charges, the
judge may accept the agreement only if "the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior[,J and .

.

. accepting the

agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing."'"
74.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 14, § IB1.3.

75. Some courts and commentators have suggested that the "real offense" elements of the
Guidelines could mitigate the disparate effects of charge bargaining. See United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (2d Cir. 1989) ("rigid adherence to 'real offense' sentencing under
the Guidelines may undercut this form of plea bargaining (known as 'charge bargaining')");
United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989) ('charge-type' plea bargains . . . may
no longer prove of much value to defendants in drug cases"); see generally Schwartz, Options in
Constructing a Sentencing System: Sentencing Guidelines Under Legislative or Judicial Hegemony,
67 VA. L. REv. 637, 680-81 (1981) (discussing foundation for "real offense" guidelines); Schulhofer, supra note 66 at 770-71.
In addition, judges may feel compelled to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea where the
counter-factual plea agreement significantly underestimates the actual Guideline range. See United
States v. Bennett, 716 F. Supp. 1137, 1147 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (judge allows two defendants to
withdraw their pleas where plea agreements underestimated amount of drugs for which they were
responsible); Schulhofer, supra note 66, at 770-71..
76. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, §§ 6BlI, 6BI.3.
77. id. § 6B1.2.
78. Id. § 6B1.4.

79. Id. § 6B1.4.
80. Id. §§ 6BI.2(b)(2), 6B1.2(c)(2).
81. id. § 6BI.2(a).
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The provision requiring accurate factual stipulations has the potential to
partially ensure the integrity of, the Guidelines system. It also represents a substantial chaige in the status quo. In pre-Guidelines plea practice, counter-factual stipulations entered solely for purposes of the litigation, and without an
intention to mislead the court, were not viewed as impermissible or unethical.
The stipulation provisions, together with their supporting commentary, indicate
the Commission's determination to ensure that plea negotiations not distort the
application of the Guidelines, or reintroduce through fact bargaining the disparities the Guidelines were intended to eliminate. The Commission, in this
case, opted unequivocally for preserving judicial control over sentencing rather
than preserving the tradition of party control over the parameters of plea negotiation.
The specification of the criteria judges will use when deciding whether to
accept or reject a plea agreement poses a different situation. With respect to
charge-reduction agreements, the Commission requires that the charges to
which the defendant pleads "adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual
offense behavior." 8 2 A defendant should not be allowed to plead to a charge
with substantially less sentence exposure than the offense committed merely for
saving the government the expense of trial. For example, when the defendant
possessed a large quantity of narcotics with intent to distribute, a plea to a
misdemeanor for simple possession of the narcotics would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior.
Though such pleas were not unheard of prior to the Guidelines, to accept
them in the context of the Guidelines system would allow a sentencing concession on grounds that the Commission explicitly rejected.8 3 This kind of compromise would also distort the substantive judgments underlying the basic
offense Guidelines, and reintroduce disparity due to uneven practices in negotiating agreements of this kind. Thus, the Commission's decision to require
charges to reflect adequately the seriousness of the underlying conduct illustrates a decision to change the form of existing practice in order to preserve
the substance of judicial control over sentencing in guilty cases - a departure
from the status quo.
The potential ambiguity of the word "adequately" raises a question about
the Commission's charge-reduction standard. If by "adequate" the Commission means that the remaining charges must fully reflect the seriousness of the
actual offense behavior, then charge manipulation is excluded. Consistent with
the Commission's "truth-in-sentencing" approach to factual stipulations, the
offense pleaded to would have to be the offense the defendant committed, and
any departure or plea concession would have to be justified independently.
The Commission's published commentary to section 6B1.2 conveys something
82. Id.
93. See id. § 3EA (entrance of guilty pica alone does not entitle defendant to sentencing
reduction, but offense level should be reduced two levels if defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility).
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of this flavor; it explains that the judge can accept the charge-reduction agreement, "if the remaining charges reflect the seriousness of the actual offense
behavior. ""
The language of the formal policy statement itself is less clear.
"[Aldequately reflect" may not mean "fully reflect" or even "reflect." In
that event, prosecutors and defense counsel are left with some definite but
undefinable (and unpredictable) room to maneuver. If the formal charges only
need to be "close enough" to the actual offense behavior, then charge bargaining may provide an effective vehicle for sentencing concessions that could
3
not otherwise be justified within the Guidelines framework." The Commission's policy statement plugs most of the loopholes that charge bargaining
practices present, but it curiously stops short of an unequivocal insistence on
"truth-in-sentencing" in this area. The ambiguities in the "adequacy" requirement are unlikely to be tested or resolved in the appellate courts, because the
charge bargaining area involves agreements accepted by both parties. Much of
the effectiveness of the Guidelines system could turn on the term's interpretation by counsel and judges at the trial level.
The Commission's approach to other forms of plea agreements raises other
difficult issues. In a policy statement entitled "Standards for Acceptance of
Plea Agreements," the Commission informs judges that they may accept binding or non-binding agreements to depart from the Guideline range only for
In its original form, this directive was not terribly
"justifiable reasons.'"'
helpful. The Commission rectified this ambiguity in an amendment effective
November 1, 1989.87 This amendment added language to the commentary of
the Guideline which makes clear that a departure from the applicable Guideline range for "justifiable reasons" must conform with the general departure
standard; there must exist "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the [GJuideline, "88 and which factor justifies a sentence other than the guideline prescribed sentence.
Though its initial vagueness invited criticism, the "justifiable reasons" language accomplished two important goals, one substantive and one procedural.
First, it emphasized that the decision whether to depart in a case adjudicated
by plea is a judicial decision, and, in the final analysis, the judge must take
responsibility for the resulting sentence. Second, by treating such plea sentences as "departures," the Commission required the judge to state explicitly
the reasons for accepting the divergent sentence. As a result, a mechanism was
84. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 6.6.
85. The court's determination that the charges do "adequately" reflect the seriousness of the
actual offense behavior must be stated on the record. GUIMELINES, supra note 14, § 6BI.2(a).
86. Id. §§ 6BI.2(b)(2), 6B1.2(c)(2).
87. This amendment added language to the commentary of section 6B1.2, which defines "justifiable reasons" in a parenthetical as follows: "i.e., that such departure is authorized by 18 US.C.
§ 3553(b)" (emphasis in original). UNmIrD STATES SENTENCING COUP'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §
6BI.2 (Nov. 1, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 GUIDELINES].
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (cross-referenced in the commentary to § 6B1.2 of the November 1989
Guidelines).
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created for collecting and analyzing the reasons for which judges depart in the
plea context. As more is learned about the process in the six years that Congress allotted for revision, refinement and modification of the initially promulgated Guidelines, 9 the Commission can identify areas in which unwarranted
disparity has occurred as a result of the plea negotiation process, and then
structure those reasons found to have empirical acceptance and validity.9
A pragmatic problem may result from this approach because of the human
factors at work in the context of the plea acceptance hearing. Except in the
most unusual cases, all the parties want the hearing to proceed smoothly and
quickly. Real-world dynamics raise serious doubt about whether the parties
will structure the plea agreement in a way that will candidly highlight for the
Commission and other outside observers the exact nature of the plea concessions and the unusual or problematic nature of any departure from the normal
Guidelines sentence. While the Commission's forcefully expressed preference
for "truth-in-sentencing" strikes the right tone, whether the plea process will
conform to the Commission's aspirations remains a question for critical study.
3.

Summary of the Commission's approach

The Commission's approach to the plea bargaining problem in its first iteration of the Guidelines is ambitious. However, the approach is also ambiguous
and inconsistent, because the Commission never squarely resolved the difference between two irreconcilable conceptions regarding the nature of the problem and its appropriate solution. One conception, the incrementalist view, saw
the plea bargaining problem as separable from the other areas of sentencing
disparity. It assumed that the plea bargaining process could be left unregulated
for the time being. Within the Commission, some incrementalists even preferred to leave the plea process unregulated indefinitely, trusting the "mar''91
ket"-like features of plea negotiation to achieve uniformity and "efficiency.
The second conception, the systemic view, saw the structuring of discretion in
the plea process as essential to the success of the sentencing reform effort.
In many places, the Guidelines side unequivocally with the systemic conception that the enabling legislation itself adopts. Clear examples in the Guidelines include the treatment of factual stipulations, the emphasis on the judicial
89. Congress gave the Commission six years to study the Guidelines in their implementation,
and then remedy any problems discovered. 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o), 992(c).
90. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 1.8; see also, Breyer, supra note 57, at 31 ("[bly collecting
the reasons that judges give for accepting plea agreements, the Commission will be able to study
the plea bargaining practice systematically and make whatever changes it believes appropriate in
future years").
91. Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1.8; see generally Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 308-22 (dis-

cussing plea bargaining from economic perspective). The incrementalist-market view ignores the
threats to fairness and efficiency that result from agency costs (conflicts of interest) and the many

other sources of market failure, together with the absence in criminal procedure of the equilibrium
mechanisms that give markets their efficiency properties. See Schulhofer, Criminal Procedure as a
Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 47-66 (1988) (examining criminal justice discretion from
perspective offered by economic analysis).
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role in deciding whether to accept a plea, and the "truth-in-sentencing" approach that requires an explicit statement of the judge's conclusions about the
"adequacy" of reduced charges and the "justifiable reasons" for plea-related
departures. Permeating many of the relevant provisions, however, is a decision
to proceed incrementally in order to preserve flexibility. It is as if a decision
for strict control was made, and then advocates of other positions kept watering down the language reflecting that decision; the result is a position that
straddles the fence. Some Commissioners were undoubtedly worried about
rocking the prosecutorial boat and the guilty plea system upon which criminal
justice administration is thought to depend, while other Commissioners worried
that, absent a systemic approach, the reform effort might fail with its halfhearted remedy. 92
Viewed as a compromise, by no means an unusual circumstance in a multimember government agency, the Commission's first product may have struck a
plausible balance between the incrementalist and systemic views. Although adherents of the systemic approach lost some ground they had apparently won at
the congressional level, the Commission's attack on the plea problem is still
far more aggressive and comprehensive than any approach attempted in any
other sentencing reform effort of the past two decades. If the Commission's
first set of Guidelines were only the first in an iterative, evolutionary process
of developing Guideline structures, half a loaf may be better than none.
Unfortunately, when concerns center on the dangers of circumvention, manipulation and the exploitation of loopholes, the "half-a-loaf" analogy may
not be apt. From a practitioner's point of view, half a loophole may be just
as good (or just as dangerous, depending on your perspective) as a whole
loophole. For good reason, the 'notion of "half a hole" is conceptually and
linguistically nonexistent. To the extent that the immediate parties to the plea
negotiation process all have an interest in avoiding the thrust of constraining
Guidelines and regulations,93 the survival of any significant loophole poses a
threat to the integrity of a Guidelines system. The guilty plea problem has
been so daunting precisely because so little can be accomplished without tackling all aspects of the problem at once.
Under these circumstances, the Commission's initial product raises two concerns that require attention throughout the process of Guideline implementation. The first is whether the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act and its
Guideline requirements are being evaded through covert, unsanctioned forms
of plea negotiation, and if so how and why. The second is whether such eva92. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Commissioner, Dissenting View on the Promulgation of Sen-

tencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18, 121 (1987);
Nagel, supra note 57, at 935-38.
93. Contrary to popular lore, the plea process often is not truly adversarial. See Schulhofer,
supra note 3, at 1041-43. Because of time and resource restraints, and the egos of Assistant
United States Attorneys, both the prosecution and the defense stand to benefit from the avoidance
of trial. The Assistant may be willing to negotiate a sentence that comports with his or her sense
of justice, regardless of the Guidelines. Since conviction is a higher priority for the Assistant than
the sentence, there is ample incentive to settle cases and avoid trials over the Guidelines.
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sions, to the extent they occur, result in merely. technical disrespect for Guideline procedures, or whether they instead seriously subvert the statute's
substantive goals of honesty and uniformity in sentencing. A description of the
way in which these concerns have figured in the Justice Department's official
response to the Guideline requirements follows. The remainder of this Article
explores these issues empirically.
C.

The Justice Department's Guidelinesfor Prosecutors

On the day the Guidelines went into effect, the Department of Justice issued
the hundred-page "Prosecutor's Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines," known
colloquially as "the Redbook."' The Redbook details guidelines for prosecutors to follow when they make charging and bargaining decisions that affect
(and are affected by) the Sentencing Guidelines.9 5
The Justice Department may have been expected to guard jealously its prerogatives against excessive interference by the Commission and the courts. Instead, the Department chose, for the most part, to side with the Commission
and Congress in urging openness, uniformity and deference to judicial sentencing primacy. In one important respect, the Department actually went further
than the Commission in precluding prosecutorial bargaining outside the Guidelines framework.9
Senior officials of the Department understood that plea bargaining must be
controlled to make the entire Guidelines process work. Although their commitment to sentencing reform, like the commitment of conservatives in Congress,
may have stemmed more from a desire to curb undue leniency than from a
fervor for equal treatment, these officials (Trott, Weld, and later Thornburgh)
were largely dedicated to plugging loopholes to every extent possible. The opposing forces, those who favored the preservation of discretion, were not primarily at the senior levels of the Department in Washington, but were
principally the trial-level attorneys in United States Attorneys' offices around
94. United States Department of Justice, Prosecutor's Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines and
Other Provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Nov. 1, 1987) [hereinafter REnnoo 1.
Subsequent to the publication of the Redbook, the Associate Attorney General and the Attorney
General issued separate memoranda paralleling the Redbook which outlined official plea practice
policy under the Guidelines. See Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum to
All Litigating Division Heads and All United States Attorneys (Nov. 3, 1987) (available at the
Commission); Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, Memorandum to Federal Prosecutors (Mar.
13, 1989) (available at the Commission).
95. REDBOOK, supra note 94, at 33-50.
96. During the debate about how the Commission should handle the plea process in policy
statements, the Justice Department urged that the strongest position be taken to prevent plea negotiations from undercutting the purposes of Guidelines. In fact, in the minds of some Commissioners, the issuance of the Trott memorandum and the Redbook were prompted by the
Department's disappointment that the Commission did not go far enough in limiting the openended plea process. For Commissioners who favored the systemic approach, the Redbook was
considered an integral part of the Guideline system's package. In contrast, those who favored the
incrementalist or status quo approach regarded with suspicion the Redbook's limits on fact-bargaining and charge-bargaining.
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the country. The Redbook must, therefore, be understood in the context of an
effort by those at the pinnacle of the criminal justice pyramid (Congress, the
Commission, and the Department of Justice) to get those on the diffuse lower
ranks, who have potentially conflicting interests and agendas, to comply with
centrally determined policies.
The Redbook addresses, among other topics, charging policy, permissible
sources of plea inducements, plea agreements, acceptance of responsibility and
departures, including departures for substantial assistance. 97 Consistent with the
Guidelines, the Redbook notes that prosecutors may offer to recommend a
sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range and the two-level acceptance of
responsibility discount, provided that this discount is consistent with the given
facts. 98 It outlines special requirements of review and approval for certain particularly sensitive types of prosecutorial actions. 99 With respect to the important area of departure recommendations based on substantial assistance in
other prosecutions, the Redbook provides no firm guidelines or standards, and
notes only that the determination whether a defendant has rendered sufficient
assistance to warrant this benefit "will necessarily be somewhat subjective and
will vary from case to case." ' 00 The Justice Department approach to sentence
recommendation agreements and charge reduction agreements, however, provides the greatest general interest and importance.' 0 '
The Redbook's discussion of sentence recommendations stresses the undesirable effects of bargaining over recommendations to depart from the Guidelines. Although recognizing that the Commission's policy statement on this
subject authorizes departures for "justifiable reasons," the Redbook concludes
that this standard "is at variance with the more restrictive departure language
of 18 U.S.C. [section] 3553(b) and that, consequently, these policy statements
should not be used as a basis for recommending a sentence that departs from
97.

REDBOOK,

supra note 94, at 33-53.

98. Id. at 43.
99. Approval of the United States Attorney or a designated supervisory official (or in a Crimi-

nal Division case, the appropriate section chief) is required:
(1) to recommend to a court a departure from the Guidelines based on a factor
other than substantial assistance in the prosecution of other parties;
(2) to enter into a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence (as opposed to an

agreement to recommend a sentence); and
(3) to depart from any of the policies set forth in the Redbook.
Id. at 49-50. Moreover, in no event, are charges involving the principal administrator of a continuing criminal enterprise or involving use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence or
drug-related offense not to be pursued, unless they cannot be "readily proven" or unless absolutely necessary to enable imposition of an appropriate sentence on someone who has rendered
substantial assistance to the government, and then only with the consent of the Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, as to continuing criminal enterprise charges or the United States At-

torney as to use of firearm charges. Id. at 50 (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Continuing Criminal
Enterprise) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use of firearm in commission of violent crime or drug-related

offense)).
100. Id. at 52.
101. Id. at 41-53.
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the [Gluidelines.' ' 0 2 The Redbook explains that substantial plea inducements
can be offered, within the Guidelines framework, by recommending a sentence
at the lower end of the applicable range together with the two-level reduction
in that case would be
for acceptance of responsibility. The total reduction
10 3
sentence.
applicable
the
in
more
or
about 35 percent
The Justice Department's explanation of the policy considerations underlying
its position is worth particular attention:
The basic reason for rejecting the Commission's policy statements
on sentence bargains and treating sentences which are the subject of
a sentence bargain in the same manner as sentences which result
from conviction after trial is that any other result could seriously
thwart the purpose of the SRA to reduce unwarranted disparity in
sentencing. It should be remembered that the purposes of the Sentencing Commission include providing "certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing, [and] avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . .." 28 U.S.C.
[section] 991(b)(1)(B). Since the vast majority of federal criminal
cases are disposed of by guilty pleas obtained through plea negotiations, a system that excepted such cases from the reforms included
in the new law would be seriously deficient. Congress could not
have expressed the concerns reflected in the SRA and the legislative
history with unwarranted disparity and uncertainty in sentencing but
have intended the reforms enacted to be limited to the small percentage of cases that go to trial./°4
Curiously, the Redbook's treatment of charge bargaining is radically different from its uncompromising attitude toward sentence bargaining. Although
the discussion of charge bargaining begins by emphasizing "Congress's concern
that plea bargaining not undermine the purposes of sentencing applies to
charge bargains as well as to sentence bargains,"'1' the Department does not
question the Commission's requirement that charge bargains need only "adequately" reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior. Hence, the Department concludes that "moderately greater flexibility" attaches to charge
bargains than to sentence bargains. I°6 Going a step further than the Commission, the Redbook also includes an interpretation of the meaning of the "adequacy" requirement. The Redbook concludes that this requirement "translates
into a requirement that readily provable serious charges should not be bar102. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original). The Justice Department recognized that following its policy on this interpretation was especially important because judges would often adhere to the policy
statement in practice if urged to do so by the government. Moreover, it would be unlikely for
departure to be tested on appeal.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 44.
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id. at 46.
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gained away. The sole legitimate ground for agreeing not to pursue a charge
. . . is the existence of real doubt as to the ultimate provability of the
charge."107
The Department's position can be seen as unobjectionable. It excludes
charge bargains based on factors other than the weakness of the case (such as
caseload pressure), 08 and it correctly underscores the propriety of dismissing
unprovable charges.
The difficulty arises in deciding whether there is a difference between
charges that are unprovable (and must be dismissed), and charges that are
"readily" provable (and must not be dismissed). If there is a distinction, then
there are charges that may or may not be dismissed, depending on the unfettered discretion of the prosecutor. That discretion, of course, is the discretion
to determine the sentence, unguided and uncontrolled.
The Redbook does contemplate a space between the unprovable and the
readily provable. While the precise breadth of this space is an empirical question, in practice it could conceivably encompass almost all the charges a prosecutor files. In fact, just in case the Department's trial attorneys missed this
point, the next sentence of the Redbook notes:
[T]he prosecutor is in the best position to assess the strength of the
government's case and enjoys broad discretion in making judgments
as to which charges are most likely to result in conviction on the
basis of the available evidence. For this reason, the prosecutor entering into a charge bargain may enjoy a degree of latitude that is
not present when the plea bargain addresses only sentencing aspects. 109
The Redbook closes this discussion of charge bargaining with even less subtlety. It argues that because prosecutors will have greater leeway and freedom

from judicial supervision when charge bargaining than when sentence bargaining, "prosecutors may wish to give greater consideration to charge bargaining
... than in the past." 10 In support of this recommendation, the Redbook
refers to a finding that, in Minnesota, the introduction of sentencing guidelines was followed by an increase in charge bargaining and a decrease in sen-

tence bargaining."' Ironically, a study that should have alerted the Department
to the potential for Guideline evasion was instead used to encourage use of

the charge bargaining loophole.
The Department's decision to back off from the stance of strict opposition
to Guideline circumvention that it articulated in connection with sentence recommendations remains a mystery. For sentence recommendations, the Depart107. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis in original).
108. Attorney General Thornburgh did allow for charge bargaining in cases where the caseload
pressure was the primary motivation. Thornburgh memorandum, supra note 94, at 4.
109. Id. at 47.
110. Id.
11l. Id.
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ment had stressed the necessity for "treating sentences which are the subject
of a sentence bargain in the same manner as sentences which result from conviction after trial," because "any other result could seriously thwart the purpose of the [statute] to reduce unwarranted disparity." ' " 2 However, the
Department could not have failed to appreciate that the same policy concern
applies with as much force to charge bargains as to sentence bargains. " '
The concern may even apply more strongly to charge bargains. The sentence
recommendations that the Department so strongly deplored would at least produce a record of the "justifiable reasons" for the sentence; accountability and
Commission review would be available. The Redbook firmly condemns this
approach, and instead encourages prosecutors to use an alternative which will
obscure the reasons for departure and give prosecutorial assessments the maximum freedom from scrutiny. The Department uses the fact that in charge dismissals prosecutorial discretion (with immunity from oversight) "is at its
zenith ' '1 4 as support for its preference for the charge-bargaining route to
guilty plea concessions.
All told, the Redbook reflects much of the same inconsistency and ambivalence that plagues the Commission's own Guidelines. Its treatment of sentence
recommendations is structured to vigorously plug potential loopholes in an attempt to prevent disparity, and restrict guilty plea concessions to the 35 percent discount made available by the acceptance of responsibility provision and
the width of the authorized Guideline range. In contrast, its treatment of
charge bargaining provides a definition of "adequacy" that could expand a
potential loophole and encourage prosecutors to take advantage of it. This
treatment could increase disparity and add unlimited possibilities for guilty
plea concessions beyond the authorized 35 to 50 percent discount. As an integral part of the overall Guideline system, the Justice Department's Redbook
reinforces some of the necessary systemic controls, but it provides additional
openings for bargaining at the cost of increased prosecutorial sentencing
power. The problem of assessing the manner in which these competing tendencies play themselves out in practice was the subject of our exploratory study.

III.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The Guideline system described above raises four categories of research
questions concerning the relationship between plea negotiation and the goals of
sentencing reform. First, how well do the stated Guideline requirements work
when applied in good faith? Second, are these requirements being avoided by
covert, unsanctioned forms of plea negotiation? Third, if this circumvention
exists, how does it occur and why? Finally, does such avoidance, to the extent
it occurs, result in merely technical disrespect for Guideline procedures, or
112. Id. at 44.
113. Perhaps this inconsistent stance reflects disagreement in the Department, or among United
States Attorneys or Assistant United States Attorneys, just as the Commission's chapters one and
six, with their different messages, reflect a lack of consensus among its members.

114.

REDBOOK,

supra note 94, at 47.

1989]

TIlE FIRST FIFTEEN MONTHS

does it seriously compromise the statute's goals of honesty, uniformity and
substantive fairness" 5 in criminal sentencing?
These broad issues produce specific questions regarding the implementation
of the Guidelines. These questions include:
(1) Under what circumstances are acceptance of responsibility discounts being afforded or withheld?
(2) What conditions are necessary to qualify for a substantial assistance departure, the extent of such departures, and the uniformity of decisions about
these matters?
(3) How often, under what circumstances, and with what impact do plea
agreements recommend or result in sentences different from those required by
the applicable sentencing Guidelines? How often and for what reasons do
judges accept such recommendations to depart?
(4) How often, under what circumstances, and with what impact do prosecutors dismiss charges in return for a plea agreement? What makes a charge
not "readily provable," and what determines whether the remaining charges
are "adequate"?
(5) What is the sentencing impact of charge dismissals, and to what extent
are they accepted or challenged by the sentencing judge?
(6) To what extent are factual stipulations used, and what is their level of
accuracy? Are sentencing facts presented to the judge in other forms, and to
what extent are these forms reliable?
(7) To what extent are prosecutors' decisions about such matters reviewed
by supervisors or governed effectively by uniform policies within each office?
To what extent do such policies differ from one district to another?
(8) What is the role of the probation officer in determining the offense conduct and other facts relevant to the Guideline determination? Can the probation officer prevent the presentation of incomplete or misleading facts to the
sentencing judge?
In designing a study to address these questions, we considered the advantages and disadvantages of an early start. The inevitable difficulties of any
shakedown period were radically compounded for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines by widespread doubts about their constitutionality and the refusal
of many judges to apply them." 6 This situation, in turn, aggravated the problem of low case volume which existed in many districts; the Guidelines only
apply to conduct occurring after November 1, 1987, and, as the post-Novem115. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 50-58 (outlining goals.of Guidelines as comprehen-

siveness, consistency and fairness in sentencing, and certainty of release dates).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional); United States v. Lopez-Barron, 685 F. Supp. 725, 727-28 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
(same); United States v. Russell, 685 F. Supp. 1245, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (same); United States
v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988) (same); United States v. Bolding, 683
F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D. Md. 1988) (same); United States v. Horton, 685 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (D.
Minn. 1988) (same); United States v. Molander, 683 F. Supp. 701, 707-08 (W.D. Wis. 1988)
(same). In all, over 200 district court judges held the Guidelines unconstitutional, while some 120
judges reached the opposite result.
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ber cases started to ripen, many cases were deferred pending resolution of the
constitutional issues. The constitutional challenges also heightened the considerable reluctance of many judges and attorneys to accept the non-trivial burden
of learning the Guidelines. Many simply hoped (or prayed) that the Guidelines
would disappear.
On the other hand, it was important to have available for comparison a
baseline of pre-existing practices and perceptions, as well as an understanding
of the process by which attorneys learned the Guidelines, and how these attorneys worked with and around them. Therefore, we decided to conduct a qualitative study to provide a picture of the situation at the beginning stage of
Guideline implementation. We recognized that any conclusions reached with
respect to this stage would not necessarily generalize to the period of full implementation, when the constitutional issues had been laid to rest.
We must also emphasize that our exploratory effort was aimed at identifying problems, not discovering successes. Our interest was focused on ascertaining whether there is Guideline manipulation throughout the plea process, and,
if so, how this manipulation occurs and under what circumstances. Thus, the
study must not be misconstrued as an indictment of the Guideline system.
That result would chill the initiation of research efforts to explore imperfections and seek improvements. Moreover, it would be particularly inappropriate
on the basis of this research, because the research was conducted pre-Mistretta, and before the Guideline system had had an opportunity to work out
its kinks. By virtue of the Commission's status as a judicial branch agency,
any attempt to control these policies must be handled delicately due to separation of powers considerations.
In view of the exploratory nature of our inquiry, we chose to focus on four
federal districts, which were regionally diverse, and not selected randomly two large districts, one medium-sized and one small. The sample was chosen
from among the jurisdictions that had a significant number of Guideline cases,
so it excluded districts where most of the judges had declared the Guidelines
unconstitutional. Given this factor and other biases inevitable in the construction of such a small sample, the research sites studied are not representative.
We can only hope to describe the situation in these districts, and to identify
certain common patterns. At the same time, to the extent that similar patterns
emerge in these four districts, a preliminary picture of the underlying processes
can be formulated.
We visited the four sites over a five-month period from September 1988 to
January 1989. In each jurisdiction, we interviewed the United States Attorney
and some of his principal criminal assistants, the Chief of the Probation Office and several probation officers, numerous trial level prosecutors, and at
least one of the judges. Since our primary focus was on the exercise of prosecutional discretion, we did not, except in one jurisdiction, interview defense
counsel, and we did not extensively interview the judges.
Early in the process, we discovered that probation officers and prosecutors
were by far the most knowledgeable officials regarding the relationships between charging, plea negotiating and sentencing. In every instance, judges at
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this stage simply did not have access to the behind-the-scenes dynamics that
were the focus of our research questions. While this finding is significant, we
did not attempt to document it in greater depth, but instead spent our time
on issues more central to the focus of our research. The omission of defense
counsel in three of the four districts was unfortunate in principle, but it had
little bearing on the specific issues that were ripe for investigation at this initial stage. Careful analysis of the perspectives of defense counsel and judges
will undoubtedly be warranted in more comprehensive follow-up studies.11 7 In
all, we interviewed thirty-four federal prosecutors, ten probation officers, and
two federal district court judges." '
All interviews were taped and transcribed, except in the few instances where
the subject objected. We promised and maintained strict confidentiality. Since
our questions not only explored compliance with the Commission's Guidelines,
but also studied adherence to Justice Department directives and internal office
policies, it was especially important to preserve confidentiality throughout the
project. Our findings are reported in detail, but particular jurisdictions and
individuals are not identified.
In preparation for our site visits, we devised a detailed interview schedule
permitting us to systematically cover all dimensions of the problem. After the
first few interviews, however, we reconsidered our commitment to this approach and proceeded less formally. Our decision to move from a structured
to an unstructured interview format was based on our observation that abstract questions (e.g., "Would you ever decide to drop a gun count? When?")
seldom elicited anything other than the "correct" answer. It proved impossible
to probe into the workings of the system without turning to an unstructured
discussion of particular cases and how they had unfolded. As such, we simply
asked AUSAs to tell us about their most recent cases. Before each trip, we
also reviewed a sample of case files submitted by probation officers from the
relevant jurisdiction to the Commission, and later asked particular AUSAs to
117. The authors are currently involved in a 10-jurisdiction follow-up study of federal plea
practices after Mistretta. For this study, the authors have conducted extensive interviews with
judges and defense counsel (both public and private).
118. In each jurisdiction, we contacted the United States Attorney. After securing his permission
to conduct the interviews, under a promise of full confidentiality and no attribution for responses,
by district or by individual, we arranged for 60 to 90 minute interviews with key supervisory
Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs) in the Criminal Division (e.g., the First Assistant, the
head of the Narcotics, Fraud, and General Crimes Sections). Additionally, we requested 60 to 90
minute interviews with approximately seven to ten additional AUSAs, preferably those who had
prosecuted cases under the Guidelines. In those instances where we had read a file that raised
questions we wished to pursue, such as why a mandatory section 924(c) gun count had been dismissed, we requested interviews with the AUSAs handling those cases. For the most part, the
AUSAs we interviewed were chosen by the United States Attorney, resulting in an over-representation of those with supervisory authority. While this method had the potential of introducing a
bias for finding the Guidelines successful, we were willing to accept this in a pilot study; we
needed to secure full cooperation, and those designated for interviews tended to have more Guideline experience. Some balance may have been introduced by our requests for certain AUSAs, when
a file we reviewed left questions open.
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explain some of the seemingly problematic cases they had handled. We found
that this procedure produced markedly different results. The same interview
subjects who had "correctly" responded that they would never drop a gun
count without approval later described ostensibly exceptional, but actually recurrent, situations in which they had done just that.
The pursuit of questions raised by specific case files was illuminating for the
more candid responses it generated, and the picture it provided of the plea
process. The Commission maintains a case file for every Guidelines case. That
file, when complete, contains a copy of the presentence report, the judgment
and commitment order, the plea agreement (if written), and the judge's statement of reasons for the sentence. "1 9 Since our study took place in the earliest
phase of Guideline implementation, and the constitutional issues had yet to be
resolved, the submission of data to the Commission was haphazard and often
incomplete. With this substantial limitation, we read all the Guideline files
available for each jurisdiction visited in order to discern charge and plea practices.
Since our procedures entailed the largely informal exploration of an amorphous territory that resists quantitative rigor, our findings center more on possibilities and patterns than on estimates of specific frequencies or proportions.
Viewed in this context, they may still help identify the scope of any problems,
and the steps that might be taken in the future, both in terms of empirical
study and social policy.
IV.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: CHARGING AND PLEA PRACTICES IN THE PREMIS TRETTA STAGE OF GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTATION

A.

Overview

Our first set of findings concerns the context in which the earliest stages of
Guideline sentencing occurred. In each jurisdiction, we found that Guideline
implementation was incomplete, and occurred in an environment of confusion
and hostility. Participants seldom understood how the Guidelines had been
drafted, the role of past practice data in the drafting, 20 how they were in119. See L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Memorandum to All Federal Judges, Chief Probation Officers and Other Judicial Officials (March 7,
1988) (available at the Commission) (outlining documentation to be sent to Commission by probation office of each district court); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(v) (1988) (judge or officer required to submit to Commission report on sentence, including offense and "information regarding
factors made relevant by the [G]uidelines").
120. Congress directed the Commission to ascertain and consider the average sentence imposed
in the past for each category of offense "as a starting point in the development of the initial sets
of [G]uidelines for particular categories of cases ...... 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). However, Congress
also noted that "[t]he Commission shall ensure that the Guidelines reflect the fact that, in many
cases, current sentences do not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense." 1d. This language makes clear that Congress never meant to bind the Commission to past practice. In drafting
the Guidelines, the Commission heeded the congressional directive, always cognizant of past prac-
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tended to be applied, and the intentions of the Justice Department in their
"Redbook."
In assessing the long-term significance of our more substantive findings,
these environmental limitations must be recognized. First, since Mistretta had
not yet been decided,' 21 the majority of judges refused to apply the Guidelines, or were willing to hold them unconstitutional whenever the defense
chose to present a challenge. Except at one research site, where the circuit
court of appeals had required all district courts to treat the Guidelines as constitutional, Guideline implementation was partial and to some extent unpredictable. Attorneys might not know if they had a "Guidelines" case until it was
assigned to a judge for trial. Moreover,22 the defense might not raise a constitutional challenge in all Guideline cases.
Second, ignorance about the Guidelines was rampant. Probation officers
generally had mastered the Guidelines, but many prosecutors only had a
sketchy acquaintance with them, and many others were either uninformed or
misinformed. Some public defenders and prosecutors were beginning to learn
the intricacies of the Guidelines, but others were said to be largely unfamiliar
with them. The private defense bar was just beginning to become aware of
them. Most notably, lawyers, 'whether for prosecution or defense, generally did
not like the Guidelines and resisted learning them. Many practitioners hoped
that the Supreme Court would abolish them.
Third, many judges were openly hostile to the Guidelines, because of the
alleged complexities involved, the reduction in their discretion, and the new
sentencing levels that some thought too severe. Judges were also highly critical
of the fact that the use of probation had been substantially restricted. In this
environment, many judges either encouraged or tolerated evasive strategems.
Parties could negotiate sentences well below the Guideline range, without fear
of judicial opposition, even in instances where probation officers might "blow
the whistle" by stressing the real facts in the presentence report.
Our substantive findings present a somewhat more optimistic picture, centering on'three principal points. First, even in this pre-Mistretta period, we found
a reasonable, perhaps unexpectedly large number of straightforward, "by-thebook" guilty plea sentences. Many defendants did plead guilty to charges describing their actual offense conduct, with the plea agreement setting forth the
tice but not necessarily adhering to it. See Nagel, supra note 57, at 930 ("[i]n the end a decision
was made to use estimates of past time served as an anchor for Commission discussions about
what should be the base offense sentence . . .") (emphasis in original); Breyer, supra note 57, at
7-8 (noting although Commission "by and large" followed typical past practice, it also made "important deviations" from this data).
121. As noted above, we visited the four sites between September 1988 and January 1989. The
Supreme Court decided Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989), on January 18, 1989.

122. Defense attorneys rarely raised constitutional challenges in bank robbery cases, because the
bank robbery Guidelines were perceived to be lower than previous sentencing practice. GUIDELINES,
supra note 14, at § 2B.3.1(b)(1). Indeed, of all the cases involving constitutional challenges to the
Guidelines, only three were bank robbery cases.
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relevant circumstances without factual manipulation, and the sentence imposed
falling within the applicable Guideline range. The principal guilty plea inducement (tacitly or explicitly promised in return for the plea) was the two-level
acceptance of responsibility discount, and a recommendation by the government for a sentence at the lower end of the Guideline range. In these instances, the Guidelines appear to work well and in the manner intended by the
Commission.
Second, we also found a substantial number of negotiated plea agreements
which involved some exception to the Guideline sentence that would normally
be applicable. Third, these extra-Guideline sentences were almost never handled
"by-the-book" - that is, in the open and honest fashion that the Guidelines
contemplate as in the departures for plea agreements detailed in Chapter Six
of the Guidelines.
Recall that the Guidelines themselves anticipate a need for exceptions to accommodate unusual cases, and provide a procedure for handling exceptions.
The judge may depart from the Guidelines on the basis of factors "not adequately considered by the Commission." In addition, when cases involve "substantial assistance," the judge has unlimited freedom to depart upon motion
of the prosecutor. Yet, pre-Mistretta, in the jurisdictions we visited, we found
that the "substantial assistance" provision was seldom invoked, and the other
departure mechanisms were rarely used. Instead, during this first phase of
Guideline implementation, the parties seemed to prefer to manipulate the facts
and charges to produce an acceptable Guideline range. The desired sentence
would then fall within the Guideline range that incorrectly appears applicable
to the case.
Guideline manipulation appeared, at least during this first phase, to take
three basic forms - charge bargaining, Guideline factor bargaining and date
bargaining. In charge bargaining, provable counts are dropped to induce a
plea; sometimes a superseding indictment entirely replaces serious felony counts
2
with a relatively minor offense. 1
In Guideline factor bargaining, background circumstances that are meant to
influence the Guideline computation are manipulated. Circumstances suggesting
aggravation for the defendant's abuse of his position of trust, extensive planning, or a defendant's major role in the offense are downplayed, and circum123, For example, an AUSA may replace a drug distribution count with a superseding indict-

ment charging the defendant with the use of a communication facility in a drug offense. In other
cases, counts are simply dismissed so the judge's ability to take them into account is mooted. The
best example of the latter is the typical pattern of indicting an individual for six counts of bank
robbery and negotiating a plea to three. Under the pre-Guideline system, the judge might consider
the six counts when fashioning his or her sentence, while still giving the defendant the benefit of
the plea agreement to the lesser number of counts. Under the Guidelines, however, a decision by
the prosecutor to reduce six counts of bank robbery to three effectively precludes the judge from
considering the six counts at all, forcing the lower sentence upon him or her. See GUIDELINES,
supra note 14, at § 6B1I.2(a) (requirement of judge to determine if plea agreement not to pursue,
or to dismiss charges "adequately reflects the seriousness of the actual offense behavior" does not
authorize judge to intrude on prosecutorial charging discretion).
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stances suggesting mitigation, such as a minimal role in the offense, are
exaggerated. The consequence of this practice is to moot distinctions that were
found under past practice studies to differentiate one sentence from another,
and thwart the underlying logic of the Guidelines and their goals of proportionality, uniformity and reduced disparity.
Date bargaining, a new technique of plea negotiation, owes its existence to
sentencing reform. Recall that the Guidelines only apply to conduct which occurred after November 1, 1987. Federal prosecutors now find it common to
confront defendants who have been engaged in fraud, drug trafficking or
some other conspiratorial scheme since early 1987 or earlier. After negotiation,
an indictment is drawn alleging a conspiracy that ends, miraculously, in October 1987; the Guidelines no longer apply, and the defendant escapes the sentencing range that would otherwise have applied to his conduct. Date
bargaining, of course, is merely a transition problem, but its impact on a sen124
tence can be enormous.
A major question, in assessing the effectiveness of the pre-Mistretta Guidelines, concerns the proportion of "by-the-book" compared to extra-Guideline
case processing. We cannot offer estimates of these crucial numbers. The situations we observed were too fluid to allow for a determination of reliable or
useful estimates. We can, however, offer several observations about the processes and outcomes which we observed.
First, the extent of Guideline evasion varied considerably from prosecutor to
prosecutor, and district to district. That variability seemed to be influenced by
the policies of the United States Attorney, his office's tradition of autonomy
from Washington, and the autonomy traditionally granted to individual prosecutors within the office. Also influential was the relationship of prescribed
Guideline sentences to the sentencing levels that were customary in the jurisdiction before the Guidelines. The impetus to manipulate and depart downward, overtly or covertly, and judicial tolerance of such manipulations or
departures, was much more pronounced where pre-Guideline sentences in that
2
jurisdiction, or before certain judges, had been below the national median.
Second, Guideline evasion as a result of charge and plea practices was, despite the variability just noted, not limited to one or two cases. Some prosecutors negotiated below-Guideline sentences in cases that were not especially
unusual. These sentences, however, did not appear on the case record as departures for substantial assistance or for other appropriate stated reasons. Although it is impossible to measure its precise frequency, such evasion was
observed in every jurisdiction studied, and was not limited to a particular kind
of case. In the remainder of this section, we describe in more detail the pat124. This type of bargaining is particularly relevant in white collar cases and drug conspiracies,
where the -offense tends to incorporate a series of transactions carried out over a long period of
time.
125. AUSAs frequently commented that they saw no need to go to trial in a case where the
judge would not, in their estimate, give the Guideline sentence. In those cases, the AUSAs merely
made life easier for all concerned by negotiating an extra-Guideline sentence.
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terns of Guideline manipulation observed, and the factors that seem to drive
this manipulation.

B.

Bargaining Standards and Procedures
1. The Initial Charging Decision

The parameters of the initial charging decision were fairly uniform across
federal jurisdictions, and there seemed to be no substantial change in these
decisions after the effective date of the Guidelines. A prosecution memo was
prepared outlining the provable charges, and this document was reviewed by a
supervisor, usually the United States Attorney or his first assistant. In principle, the prosecutor charged every offense that could be proved. Even inconsequential counts were included, since they provided the prosecutor with
something to give away in return for a plea; the defense attorney, in turn,
could "win" something for his client. In a case involving a large number of
counts, secondary offenses would probably not be charged when they no
longer added significant additional sentencing exposure. At site 2, one AUSA
said that assistants sometimes would not charge certain counts (e.g., a count
carrying a mandatory minimum), and no one would ever find out. AUSAs at
site 2 appeared to have considerable autonomy, after their initial training period in the unit responsible for the simplest cases. Nonetheless, this kind of
independent charge reduction was unusual at the initial charging stage.
2.

Preindictment Contacts with the Defense

Preindictment contacts with the defense varied widely from district to district. At site 1, such contacts were the norm. Office policy required prosecutors to attempt a plea negotiation in every case. As a result, prosecutors
routinely contacted defense counsel prior to indictment (if the defendant's
counsel was known). In contrast, at site 2, preindictment contacts with defense
counsel were rare in drug cases which were numerous in the jurisdiction. Most
drug cases were initiated by arrest, and the government had only ten days to
indict. Defense attorneys were usually unwilling to negotiate under those circumstances, since many of the judges had struck down the Guidelines, and
counsel would not know until after the indictment whether the Guideline sentencing provisions would be applicable. Preindictment negotiations, however,
were said to occur in 99 percent of the white collar cases. The prosecutors at
site 2 would usually wait for defense counsel to contact them.
At site 4, where every judge applied the Guidelines, preindictment contacts
were rare. Except in simple cases, in which prosecutors might have sought
consent to proceed by information, negotiations were deferred until after indictment.
The various approaches to preindictment contacts suggested that charge bargaining would be much more obvious in some jurisdictions than in others.
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Where preindictment contacts were rare, charge dismissals, superseding indictments and charge reduction plea agreements would illustrate the scope of the
bargaining that occurred. In districts such as sites 1 and 2, charge bargaining
often occured through agreements not to file. Such agreements are included
within the scope of the bargaining regulated by section 6BI.2(a),' 2 6 but they
do not fall literally within the terms of Rule 1(e)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 27 and they are, in any event, very difficult to determine both qualitatively and statistically.
3.

Substantive Criteria for Plea Negotiation

The substantive criteria for plea negotiation varied considerably within the
four jurisdictions. Even though AUSAs were encouraged to recommend the
acceptance of responsibility discount and the bottom of the Guideline range in
all four districts, the policy toward charge reduction varied greatly. The
Justice Department's Redbook should be, of course, the principal source of
such policy. Prosecutor supervisors seemed to know well the policy directives
of the Redbook, and to take its restrictions on the dropping of important
counts seriously. However, among trial-level assistants, familiarity with the
Redbook was inconsistent. At site 1, the first location visited, many AUSAs
admitted they never read the Redbook. Some were barely aware of its existence. Most AUSAs did, however, claim familiarity with the local jurisdictional (internal office) memoranda on Guideline policy for prosecutors. The
2
memos were taken much more seriously than directives from Washington.'1
Similarly, at site 2, the Redbook appeared to be viewed as a form of naive.
and unwanted outside interference; it was regarded with a feeling just short of
contempt. At site 4, AUSAs also seemed to lack a working knowledge of the
126.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 14, at § 6BI.2(a) (section relating to charge-reduction plea agree-

ments, applies to any "plea agreement that includes the dismissal of any charges or any agreement
not to pursue potential charges") (emphasis added). Moreover, the Sentencing Reform Act clearly
contemplated that the Commission policy statements on charge bargaining, required to be issued
under section 994(a)(2)(E), would address withholding of charges as well as dismissal of charges.

See S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 167 (this approach was intended to "provide an opportunity
for meaningful judicial review of proposed charge-reduction plea agreements"). Indeed, the bill
submitted to the Senate included, in a section of technical amendments, a provision to amend
Rule 11(e) "to clarify that the rule covers withholding of charges as well as dismissal of charges."
Id. (emphasis added). Although these technical amendments were not enacted, the legislative history contains no indication that this last-minute modification reflected any change in the intended
substantive reach of the Commission's section 994(a)(2)(E) obligation to provide guidance for
charge bargaining.
127. Compare S. REP. 225, supra note 24, at 166 (consideration of whether to accept or reject
plea agreement under Rule 11(e) should be included in Guidelines' policy statements) and GumELINES, supra note 14, at § 6BI.2(a) (judge should comply fully with Rule 11(e), but must determine if agreement "adequately reflects" defendant's actual conduct) with FED. R. Cgnn. P.
I l(e)(l)(A) (judge "shall" not participate in any plea discussions).
128. Interview #0204 at t9 ("when someone says 'This is a Justice Department policy,' that
stands in stark contrast to 'This is office policy.' If they say its office policy, people will follow
it. But if they say its Justice Department policy, they speak volumes by omission, if you know
what I mean. Because they're not saying it's office policy, they're saying its Justice policy").
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Redbook standards. Our observations suggest that these directives should more
aptly have been titled the "Unread Book."
Apart from Justice Department policies, most offices possessed internal criteria for charge bargaining. At site 1, defendants were expected to plead to
the two top counts. At site 2, defendants were expected to plead to half the
counts in the indictment, including the most serious charges. At site 4, there
were no written or oral policies on the standards to be used in determining
the proper extent of a charge reduction bargain. These differences, however,
did not seem to have significant sentencing implications. The routine departures from standard office rules of thumb in response to individual circumstances were more important.
4.

Procedures for Review of Plea Bargains

The procedures for review of plea bargains also varied widelY'. At site 1, all
plea agreements were required to be in writing, and were reviewed at several
levels of the hierarchy. Although the final sign-off by the United States Attorney was in most cases perfunctory, at least one or two supervisors closely examined any given plea agreement.
Conversely, at site 2, plea agreements, except agreements to provide substantial assistance, were never in writing. Supervisors were confident that the triallevel assistants understood office policy and they would strictly adhere to those
rules. Supervisors relied on the office's hiring standards and the deterring
sanction of immediate dismissal that could result from a deviation from office
policy. As a result, supervisors comfortably entrusted AUSAs with virtually
complete day-to-day autonomy and freedom from formal oversight. However,
based on information garnered during our interviews, this confidence was unwarranted. The study revealed that assistants knowingly deviated from office
policy, and consciously failed to inform their superiors of their actions.
Site 4 was unique in terms of intra-office supervision and review. Descriptions of practices were inconsistent. Supervisor #0405 stated that plea agreements were "supposed to be" run by him. In drug task force cases (i.e.,
major narcotics investigations), approval requests were required to be in writing. In other cases, approvals could be requested orally, but were expected to
be sought. In contrast to the supervisor's testimony, trial assistant #0402 reported that AUSAs could drop charges without obtaining higher approval, and
permission was required only to drop a case completely. Trial assistant #0408
commented that approval was needed for any charge reduction that would affect the sentence - that is, a decision to reduce a drug distribution count to
simple possession would require the approval of the United States Attorney.
Finally, trial assistant #0406 said he would probably informally seek the approval of a supervisor, but he did not think this approval was a requirement.
He added, "I never really thought about it much .... He [my supervisor] is
basically aware of what goes on and consequently in most cases I may tell
him after the fact what has happened.'' 2 It is our impression that this de129. Interview #0406 at 22.
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scription of informality most closely accorded with the actual situation at site
4, with the important qualification that, in some important cases, superiors
apparently were not expressly informed of the AUSA's exercise of discretion,
either before or after the case was processed.
C.

Acceptance of Responsibility

Among defense counsel and prosecutors, and to some extent among probation officers and judges, there was a pervasive perception that the acceptance
of responsibility discount was too low." 30 In part, this perception resulted from
the erroneous convention of viewing the discount as "only two points," when,
31
in reality, it could mean a discount of 25 percent for most defendants.
Many AUSAs failed to appreciate the width of the discount. Nonetheless, they
vigorously pushed the "only two points" argument.
Several related factors combined to reinforce the perception that the twolevel reduction, even if understood as a 35 to 50 percent discount, was not
large enough. White collar offenders who could realistically hope for and expect probation before the Guidelines, were said to believe that if the two-level
reduction was insufficient to bring them within the range for which probation
was authorized, they would pass up the 35 to 50 percent discount, seeking to
avoid prison at all costs. Unless a bargain involving probation was offered,
they could be expected to take their chances for acquittal at trial.
At the other end of the spectrum, where offenders faced terms that would
keep them in prison with no hope of parole for fifteen to twenty years, the
possibility of getting out three to five years earlier was thought to be an insignificant inducement. Such offenders reportedly would take their chances for
acquittal at trial, unless offered a much greater discount.
In addition, in the early months of Guideline implementation, it was reported that there was routine granting of the acceptance of responsibility discount, coupled with the low end of the Guideline range, to defendants
convicted after trial, provided they testified truthfully and gave some indication of remorse. This practice seemed especially prevalent at sites 1 and 2,
where sentencing judges were inclined to view Guideline sentences as longer
than those they were accustomed to imposing prior to the Guidelines. To the
extent that a convicted defendant can expect to receive a two-level reduction
after trial by merely voicing remorse, the acceptance of responsibility discount
obviously affords scant incentive to plead guilty.
Complaints about the inadequacy of the two-level reduction led many AUSAs and some probation officers to predict a massive increase in the number
of trials. To date, however, this increase has not occurred. The Commission's
130. In a letter to the Chairman of the Sentencing Commission from a judge who shall remain
anonymous, the judge wrote that he "felt from the inception of the Guidelines and ... even
more strongly today that the fixed two level reduction for 'acceptance of responsibility' ... is
inadequate for the great majority of cases." (emphasis in original).
131. When combined with a sentence at the lower end of the Guideline range, the discount
could translate into a 35-50 percent discount.
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Annual Report for 1988 indicates that, during that period, 90 percent of the
defendants sentenced under the Guidelines had pleaded guilty - a figure not
significantly different from the pre-Guidelines guilty plea rate. 13 2 However, we
cannot be certain whether the relative stability of the guilty plea rate indicates
that the "acceptance" discount is set at an appropriate level, or whether the
system has found alternative ways to grant guilty plea inducements. Possibly,
both statements are true.
D. Substantial Assistance
Section 5KI.1 used to state that "upon motion of the government stating
that the defendant has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person . . .the court may

Subsequent to our site visits, an amendment,
depart from the [GJuidelines."I'
effective November 1, 1989,114 deleted the "good faith effort" language. Pursuant to the amendment, assistance of actual value became a predicate for the
motion to depart. Both the old formulation and the new formulation leave to
prosecutorial discretion the decision whether to request such a departure, and,
if so, under what circumstances.' 5
Cooperation agreements outline the assistance a defendant is expected to
provide, and the sentence recommendation the government may make in exchange. In all four jurisdictions, cooperation agreements were always in writing, and were always reviewed at one or more supervisory levels. In other
areas relating to cooperation, however, there were significant differences in
policies and practices.
Prosecutors at site 1 quickly became comfortable with the substantial assistance provision, and were using it frequently in cases involving significant cooperation. As a rule of thumb, defendants who made an early offer of
cooperation and delivered successfully on their commitment earned a 50 percent reduction from the prescribed Guideline sentence. This "first-in, best-out"
approach afforded prosecutors great leverage in implementing divide-and-conquer tactics. Generally, prosecutors at site I would not offer to make departure motions unless a defendant's efforts to assist bore fruit.
Prosecutors' principal concern at site 1 was to assure that the judge did not
go too low in imposing a sentence, once the section 5Kl.1 motion released
him or her from the Guidelines and any applicable statutory minimum. Because prosecutors in that jurisdiction viewed many of their judges as exces132. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, 1988 ANNUAL REPOPT 23 (1989).
133. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 5KI.1.
134. 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 5KI.I.
135. The Commission's decision to tie section 5KI.1 to a government motion parallel the statutory language relating to the authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) ("upon motion of the Government the court shall have the authority to impose
a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's
substantial assistance . . ."). The Commission decided to extend the "substantial assistance" bene-

fit to all cases, not just those involving mandatory minimum sentences.
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sively lenient sentencers, they were reluctant to leave them with a totally free
hand in sentencing. Accordingly, this concern was usually addressed by linking
the departure motion to a plea agreement for a definite sentence, or by not
moving to waive, when possible, one charge with a statutory mandatory minimum.
At the other research sites, prosecutors had reported no explicit rules of
thumb concerning the appropriate reward for cooperation, and derided the notion that any general standard, such as the 50 percent discount principle used
at site 1, could cover the diversity of cases. At site 2, prosecutors did not
attempt to work out the cooperation discount, even on a case-by-case basis.
When a defendant performed satisfactorily, prosecutors would make the departure motion and write the court a letter outlining the extent of the defendant's
assistance, using strong language in cases of highly valuable cooperation. The
extent of the departure, however, was left to the court.
At site 3, where cooperation agreements were required to be in writing, the
office relied on a form letter not tailored to any individual case. In effect,
defendants agreed to provide whatever the prosecutor requested and to take
their chances on his evaluation of their compliance. Unlike the situation at site
1, which predicated departure motions on the likely end results of a defendant's assistance, cooperation agreements at site 3 only required "good faith
efforts." Some assistants felt that defendants should not be "punished" for
having limited knowledge; therefore, a good faith effort was considered sufficient. A unit chief stressed, however, that the office would enter into a cooperation agreement only if the defendant's proffer of assistance was likely to be
of use.
The existence of standards, more or less definite, and review procedures for
departure motions based on cooperation suggests a more-orderly system than
we found in practice. Not only were the criteria and boundaries of prosecutorial policy under section 5KI.1 quite fluid, but when AUSAs found themselves
bumping up against those boundaries, they also devised ways to reward cooperation indirectly - contravening both the Guidelines and their own office's
policies. In addition, even in substantial assistance cases that could easily qualify under section 5KlI.1, prosecutors sought other ways to reward cooperation
- using vehicles not within the Guidelines framework.
A few prosecutors in every jurisdiction, excluding site 1, expressed resistance
to using the formal section 5KI.1 procedure. The primary complaint was that
the departure procedure provided insufficient certainty for both the prosecution and the defense. Although a section 5KI.1 motion frees the judge from
the Guidelines and any statutory minimum, such a motion does not guarantee
that the judge will depart, nor does it ensure that any departure will afford
the defense a truly substantial benefit. Several prosecutors reported experiences
in which defendants insisted on knowing the exact quid pro quo before agreeing to wear a body wire or provide other potentially life endangering forms of
cooperation. Conversely, prosecutors sometimes feared that judges, once free
to depart, would give a far greater sentencing concession than the prosecutors
themselves thought warranted. In both instances, prosecutors sought other
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means to extend the "right" benefit. Usually, this meant restructuring the
charges to guarantee the defendant a lower sentence, while keeping the judge
oriented toward the framework of a specific Guideline range. Examples of this
sort of charge manipulation are discussed below in connection with charge
bargaining practices.
Of even greater concern were situations in which prosecutors used extraGuideline tactics to reward cooperation that did not qualify as "substantial
assistance" under section 5KI.1. A common situation presenting this problem
was found in cases involving so called "skells" (i.e., addict-sellers who deal in
small quantities of drugs to support their own habits). Since these defendants
often have a substantial record of prior narcotics convictions, they face long
13 6
The
prison terms, even when charged with distribution of small quantities.
to
try
hard
often
"skells"
and
strong,
is
accordingly
cooperation
for
incentive
3
to
offer.'
little
they
have
however,
offer substantial assistance. Typically,
Such defendants cannot qualify for a section 5Ki.1 motion. Under the
Guideline principles, their limited and ineffectual cooperation is not a criterion
for a reduced sentence. Often, however, prosecutors in the field did not view
matters in this light. Some prosecutors found ways to reward cooperation
without making a formal section 5K1.1 motion, and sometimes did not even
consult or inform their superiors of this reward. Prosecutors did this partly
because the statute and Guidelines mandate a sentence more severe than they
thought warranted for such a case, and partly because they thought a defendant who badly wanted to cooperate should not be "penalized" for his lack
of information. 3 ' Such rewards could take the form of significant charge reas dropping a "schoolhouse" count, 13 9 or charging only simple
duction, such
I4o
possession.
In other instances, the office may have chosen simply to ignore its policy on
cooperation. One such instance came to light due to the vigilance of the
judge. At sentencing, the prosecutor made an oral motion for a section 5KI.1
departure allegedly based on substantial assistance, but provided little detail.
In an exercise of caution, the judge adjourned the hearing and insisted that
the government file a formal written motion for departure.' 4 ' In response, the
136. For example, consider a defendant who is convicted of distributing less than five grams of

cocaine base (crack) under 21 U.S.C. section 841. Assume he has two prior convictions for distributing equally small amounts of crack and that he is at least eighteen years old. Because he has
two prior controlled substance convictions, the defendant falls under the "Career Offender" provision in the Guidelines. GU ELINES, supra note 14, at § 4B1.1; 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). Under this
provision, the defendant is faced with a Guideline range of 262 to 327 months, or roughly 22 to
27 years.
137. Interview #0204 at 6. "Middle-level dealers . .. are not stupid. They know a guy like this
will roll the minute that he is grabbed, so he doesn't have access to much information." Id.
138. Interview #0109 at 22.
139. 21 U.S.C. § 845(a) (providing that anyone violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) or 21 U.S.C. §
856 by manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school is punishable by up to twice imprisonment authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)).
140. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (maximum penalty of one year imprisonment, absent prior record).
141. Section 5Kl.1 itself does not require that the departure motion be in writing. GUIDELINES,
supra note 14, § 5KI.I.
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prosecutor wrote the judge a letter requesting, but not formally moving for,
departure and cited the defendant's willingness not to contest a forfeiture proceeding and other insubstantial reasons. 14 2 The absence of a formal motion for
departure may have been the prosecutor's compromise with an office policy
that plainly would not have found substantial assistance on these facts. Indeed, the judge indignantly refused the invitation to depart.
Situations like the one described above are neither common nor rare. They
reflect an individual prosecutor's desire to deviate from Guideline principles.
In the present case, the prosecutor's motives evidently included a desire to
mitigate a sentence he or she judged too harsh for a seemingly sympathetic
defendant, a desire to sweeten a plea inducement to avoid contested guilt and
forfeiture proceedings, and a desire to reward a cooperative attitude falling far
short of substantial assistance. Although the effort to encourage departure
failed in this case, it is too early to determine to what extent judges will succeed in detecting and rebuffing these kinds of efforts.
Similarly, neither unusual nor typical was the articulated desire by some
government attorneys to reduce the sentence of a defendant who wishes to
cooperate, but for a variety of reasons has nothing of value to offer. While
rewards for cooperation historically grew out of prosecutorial needs, especially
in complex cases, some AUSAs lamented their inability to assist the hapless
defendant who merely expressed a desire to cooperate. When the legitimate
section 5KI.1 motion failed to present itself, they searched for other means to
accomplish the same goal, or went ahead and filed the section 5K1.1 motion
with full knowledge that no substantial assistance had been provided.
E.

Other Vehicles for Negotiation
1. Date Bargaining

Date bargaining occurs when the AUSA agrees, in return for a plea, to
charge only pre-Guidelines conduct. The procedure was especially frequent at
site 1, where sentencing judges generally viewed the Guidelines as more severe
than they preferred, especially since the Guidelines mandate sentences above
the average sentences that were meted out in this district prior to the Guidelines."4 3 The prospect of escaping the Guidelines was therefore attractive for
the defense, and could result in large sentence reductions. For example, a defendant charged in a very extensive heroin, cocaine and marijuana distribution
scheme (#0108) was allowed to plead to eighty-four pre-Guideline counts and
received a twelve-year sentence, with eligibility for parole. If charged as a
142. The commentary to section 5KI.I indicates that "substantial assistance is directed to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than the defendant.
GUrDELINES, supra note 14, at 5.41.

143. Indeed, interview subjects in site 1 reported that judges in that district generally sentenced
below the national average before the Guidelines. Interview #0102 at 10.
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post-Guideline conspiracy, the case would have drawn a sentence range of
twenty to twenty-four years, with no eligibility for parole. Even AUSAs who
had ethical reservations about fact bargaining expressed no qualms about indicting only for pre-November conduct. An AUSA said that to charge less
than the full amount of a fraud would involve misleading the court, lbut to
charge only pre-November conduct would not involve misrepresentation. "4
2.

Guideline Factor Bargaining

a. Scope of the problem. Nearly all the offense Guidelines specify, in addition to a "base offense level," certain "specific offense characteristics" that
aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of the offense, and require increases or
decreases in the offense level. In addition, Chapter 3 of the Guidelines specifies upward and downward adjustments based on factors such as the defendant's role in the offense, and vulnerability of the victim. The Guidelines and
accompanying policy statements make clear that the existence of these factors
is to be determined on the basis of all the relevant facts of the case. Parties
are not to create artificial or non-existent Guideline factors by factually inaccurate stipulations or any other form of misrepresentation.", Nonetheless, in
more than a few cases, the real facts were changed.
We do not want to exaggerate the extent of this problem. We feel confident
that in large numbers of cases, no effort was made to distort drug quantities,
amounts of property loss or other Guideline factors. In other cases, although
the litigants may have minimized certain factors, the presentence report made
the true situation clear, and the judge determined the sentence on that basis.
Nonetheless, we did encounter cases in every jurisdiction in which offense level
adjustments had been based on inaccurate facts, or where prosecutorial concessions on factual issues could have been resolved differently if decided on
the merits at a sentencing hearing.
In response to direct questions about fact-bargaining, most AUSAs and
nearly all supervisors flatly denied its existence. A few AUSAs warned that,
despite this official story, "realistically, there is" fact-bargaining.'" When the
facts of specific cases were reviewed in detail, numerous AUSAs acknowledged
instances of downplaying crucial facts.
Several examples of fact-bargaining could be cited. A few illustrations will
suggest the nature of the problem:
(1) In a drug conspiracy case, defendants told an undercover agent that they
planned to break into a car to get "six bricks" of cocaine. Although the car
contained six kilograms of the drug, the defendants claimed that they had expected to get six pounds, a difference that took them out of the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence and reduced the Guideline offense by four levels. The AUSA accepted the defendants' version in order to induce the plea,
144. Interview #0102 at 2.
145. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, §§ 6BI.4(a), 6B1.4(d).

146. Interview #0101 at !1; Interview #0104 at 4.

19891

THE FIRST FIFTEEN MONTHS

noting, however, with considerable candor, that had there been a trial, six kilograms would have been readily provable. 47
(2) Two defendants were indicted in a conspiracy to distribute ten kilograms
of cocaine. One, who had participated in delivering the supply to a courier in
Ecuador, and then took personal possession of part of the shipment in the
United States, was given a two-level reduction for having played a "minor
role" in the offense, apparently on the grounds that his codefendant was the
boss in the endeavor. That codefendant, because he had not taken personal
possession of the drugs, had a "mere presence" defense, and was allowed to
plead to a superceding indictment charging only conspiracy to commit simple
possession (which provided a statutory maximum of one year in prison, and
reduced the applicable Guideline range from seventy-eight to ninety-seven
48

1
months to zero to six months).

(3) Defendant, arrested at the scene of a large cocaine buy, admitted to
possessing a gun found in the back seat of his car. The defendant argued,
however, that the presence of the gun at the time of the offense was fortuitous; he claimed that the gun was not working properly and was being "taken
in for repairs." An ATF test confirmed "some problems" in firing the gun,
but the defendant's story, even if plausible, was not necessarily decisive under
section 2D1.1(b)(1), which requires a two-level enhancement for any firearm
"possessed during the commission of the offense." Nonetheless, in order to
49
get the plea, the AUSA agreed both to drop the section 924(c) count,1 and
50
not to assert the Guideline enhancement for the weapon.
(4) In another drug case, a weapon was found in the trunk of the defendant's car at the time of a large buy. The AUSA agreed to drop the section
924(c) count and not to seek the Guideline enhancement for the weapon, because the defendant argued that the presence of the weapon was accidental.
He claimed that he always carried the weapon in the trunk, and did not expect to use his car for this drug deal."'
Several reported cases reveal a similar dynamic. In United States v. Fiterman,"52 for example, a search of a large suburban home uncovered over 600
pounds of marijuana. The homeowner, a middle aged woman, was charged as
a conspirator, but the AUSA agreed to a four-level reduction for the defendant's minimal role allegedly on the grounds that she had merely permitted
one of her workers to store the marijuana at her home in return for rather
modest payments. At sentencing, the government left the impression that the
drugs had been stored in the garage. The judge discovered, however, by carefully reading the file, that officers executing the search warrant had found the
marijuana in the defendant's bedroom closet. The judge noted that this was
147.
148.
149.
150.

Interview #0109 at
Interview #0404 at
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Interview #0107 at

13-17.
19.
(providing for a mandatory five-year consecutive sentence).
4.

151. Interview #0110 at 14.

152. No. 89 CR 176-1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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scarcely suggestive of the "minimal role" painted by the government, but felt
constrained to grant the four-level reduction in the end, because of the lack of
proof put on by the government, and the need to grant the defendant the
benefit of the doubt.
Situations like these present four distinct problems. First, the judgment
about offense seriousness and the appropriate sentence made by the Commission is replaced by the individual judgment of the AUSA (with little effective
opportunity for oversight by the judge). Second, uniform sentencing is compromised, because some AUSAs refuse such adjustments and others make
them in a more limited (or in more generous) fashion. Third, the inducement
to plead guilty becomes overwhelmingly powerful; the plea offer we have just
described could appear irresistible, even for the defendant with a legitimate
legal defense, or the factually innocent defendant with a substantial likelihood
of acquittal at trial. Finally, the defendant who pleads to a reduced charge,
because of doubts as to factual innocence, may be sentenced as if he were
guilty of the greater charge, since the government may be able to avoid revealing the weakness of its case on the original, more severe charges.' 53
b. Control of fact-bargaining. The Guidelines were formulated with full
awareness of the need for procedures to guard against factual distortion. Not
only are inaccurate and misleading factual stipulations specifically prohibited,
but the Guidelines, along with Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, also prohibit waiver of the presentence report. 54 As a result, the judge
should have, prior to sentencing, the probation officer's independent assessment of the facts relevant to sentencing. In order to ensure that the judge's
sentencing freedom is not constrained by agreement of the parties, the Guidelines further provide that whenever the parties tender a plea agreement that
would have this effect (i.e., a plea agreement for a definite sentence or for
dismissal of charges), the judge must defer the decision whether to accept that
agreement until after the presentence report has been prepared and considered.' 55 These procedures are often adequate to prevent factual manipulation.
153. Consider the situation in which a key prosecution witness becomes unavailable (or some
other problem of proof arises) after the defendant has been indicted. The government might then
agree to allow the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge in a superseding indictment. If the
government does not inform the judge of its reason for dropping the original charges, the government may be able to persuade the judge to depart upwards based on the circumstances underlying
the more serious counts. As the D.C. Circuit cautioned in a recent opinion:
[Ilin cases where the government enters a plea for lack of proof of the more serious
offense, unless it informs the sentencing judge of the reasons for its willingness to
offer the plea, the government has an unfair advantage: It locks in a Guidelines
sentence with the potential for upward departure based on facts it merely has to
proffer at a plea hearing rather than prove at trial.
United States v. Adonis, 891 F.2d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
154. Rule 32(c)(1) does permit the judge to dispense with a presentence report, only after explaining, on the record, why sufficient information is already available under Rule 32(c)(1). See
also GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 6AI.1 (Commentary).
155. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 6B1.1(c).
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In the early days of Guideline implementation, defense counsel and AUSAs
were sometimes surprised to discover that their agreements to understate drug
quantities or amounts lost through fraud were defeated by accurate present6
ence reports that the judges felt obliged to follow."1 Most attorneys now appreciate that outright misrepresentation, especially in relation to drug
quantities, will simply not work, because the probation officer will learn the
true facts and report them to the judge. As a result, attempts at factual distortion are now more unusual, and necessarily are more subtle when they
occur.
One might ask how factual distortion can succeed at all? The answer is
complex: a function of the resources of the Probation Office, the ambiguity
of the Probation Officer's role, the attitude of the AUSA, the policies and
attitudes of the judge, and the nature of the factual issues to be addressed.
A crucial item in the presentence investigation is the "Government Version
of the Offense," a statement usually prepared by the AUSA in charge of the
case and submitted to the probation officer in writing. In the past, this document was the probation officer's principal (perhaps sole) source of information
about the offense, and it is still heavily relied upon. In some of our jurisdictions (although not everywhere), probation officers reported a remarkable
change in the character of these "Government Versions." Prior to the Guidelines, these statements contained elaborately detailed, even lurid, descriptions
of the offense circumstances and the defendant's multiple associations with the
world of crime. In contrast, with the advent of the Guidelines, the "Government Version" suddenly became a model of concise, no-nonsense prose - just
the immediate circumstances of the charged offense, with few embellishments.
Probation officers at site 1' l7 felt especially strongly that prosecutors were
choosing their words carefully to avoid transmitting any information that
might trigger an offense-level aggravator, and upset a negotiated plea.
Under the Guidelines, it is obviously important for probation officers to
avoid total dependence on the "Government Version." Probation officers reported a practice of trying to talk to the AUSA and/or review his file. In
drug cases, they may also have tried to interview the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) case agent.
Cooperation with the probation officer was somewhat uneven, but generally
good. Probation officers reported scattered difficulties in getting the information they sought, but usually attributed problems to the personality and time
constraints of individual prosecutors rather than to any systemic cover-up effort. Probation officers have little recourse if an AUSA is determined to keep
certain facts of the case from view, but this kind of factual manipulation
rarely happened, as far as we observed.
156. One probation officer reported that in the early period of Guideline implementation, the
government and the defense stipulated to reductions in the offense levels and the judges often felt
bound to accept the agreement. Interview #0304 at 11. According to the probation officer, at that
time, judges were not deferring acceptances of plea agreements. Id.
157. Interview #0104 at 5.
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The dynamic of the presentence investigation can work, in other ways, to
obscure or minimize the real facts. In drug cases, quantities are all important.
The crucial determinations may require careful study of tape recorded surveillance, but the conspirators often speak in a foreign language, heavily laced
with jargon and code. Transcription is therefore laborious; there are many
reasons why the DEA and prosecutors may choose at some point to consider
the case complete. The determination of the drug quantity to be charged can
be quite arbitrary in such cases.
An additional difficulty arose at site 4. Here the judges in one outlying division instructed the Probation Office not to include in its presentence reports
any reference to drug quantities for which the defendant had not been convicted.' 58 Although this directive was plainly illegal under the Guidelines, the
Probation Officers felt that, as officers of the court, they had no choice but,
to comply. In order not to antagonize the judges, the United States Attorney
decided not to challenge this policy by appeal. This situation appeared to be
an isolated one, but it illustrates the potential depth of systemic resistance to
"truth-in-sentencing." 5 9
Far more common as a means of fact manipulation was the use of ambiguities of proof. More so than in the past, AUSAs were likely in guilty plea
cases to limit their "Government Version" to unambiguous facts on which the
opposing counsel had agreed. Other potentially aggravating circumstances were
not affirmatively hidden or misrepresented; they were just not mentioned if
they fell outside the scope of the negotiated deal.
It was not uncommon in such situations for the probation officer to have
picked up the omitted details from the file or other sources - the presence of
a weapon at the time of the offense, circumstances suggesting a major role,
an abuse of trust or additional property lost. In more than a few cases, probation officers reported their reliance on such information to support Guideline calculations higher than those agreed by the parties. Prosecutors were
seldom troubled by such developments. They could easily fall back on alleged
difficulties of proof. At sentencing, the defense would challenge the probation
officer's assessment, and the AUSA would support the defense's more conservative version. The AUSA need not have said that the probation officer's
facts were wrong. The formula was simply, "Your Honor what we can prove
is . ... " As another prosecutor told us:
You just say that the evidence we would have offered at trial would
have been X, Y and Z. In other words, it would not have supported what the Probation Officer is saying.16°
158. In a follow-up study, we came upon an even more striking illustration in a jurisdiction not
included within our sample. There, a judge ordered the probation officer to "include the stipulation of facts as the statement of the circumstances . .. of the offense ...

without conducting any

independent investigation." Interview #0904 at 9.
159. Also at site 4, we were told that prosecution and defense routinely agreed to waive the

presentence report when a defendant pled guilty in a "simple" immigration case. Interview #0401
at 2; see FED. R. CalM. P. 32(c)(1). Judges acquiesce in this procedure in order to expedite the
process, even though such waivers are expressly prohibited by this rule.
160. Interview #0101 at 18.
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Despite their reliance on a formula designed to avoid outright misrepresentation, the prosecutor in these cases was not being candid with the court. The
Guidelines require that factual ambiguities be disclosed for judicial resolution,
not bargained away.' 6' When we asked prosecutors what their position would
have been if the case went to trial, the problems of proof suddenly evaporated
or assumed much less importance. Repeatedly, prosecutors conceded that, in
the event of trial, they would have taken the same position as the probation
officer. 6 2 Sometimes they would have had no difficulty disparaging as frivodefense objections they had been willing to honor for the sake
lous the same
63
of a plea.
In these situations, the probation officer was left out in the cold. None of
the attorneys was willing to defend his position in court. The judge was hesitant to find facts denied by both sides, and, in any event, the probation officer was, like counsel, not anxious to force a trial of the case. Not only would
the judge rule against the probation officer's position, but the probation officer also felt out of step and uncomfortable to be regarded as the troublemaker:
So there we were, the lone voice in the wilderness with everybody
else against us saying "that can't be." And the Probation Officer
...can't possibly have any better fix on this than ...

all of these

smart people who have been to law school, so you end up having
your position shot out of the window. You end up walking out of
there thinking, "Well, I guess I'm the only fool in that courtroom
because everyone else had the answer ... ." (TIhe officers are getting a little demoralized.'"
As experience under the Guidelines accumulates, it is likely that judges will
become more sensitive to the probation officer's dilemma and more willing to
make independent factual determinations with the officer's help.' 65 It is also
161. GumEuLIKEs, supra note 14, § 6B1.4(b). The commentary to this section provides as follows:
[Tlhe overriding principle is full disclosure of the circumstances of the actual offense
and the agreement of the parties. The stipulation should identify all areas of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty that may be relevant to the determination of sentence. Similarly, it is not appropriate for the parties to stipulate to misleading or

non-existent facts, even when both parties are willing to assume the existence of such
"facts" for purposes of the litigation.
Id. at 6.8.
162. Interview #0109 at 17; interview #0111 at 18-19.
163. Interview #0109 at 17.
164. Interview #0304 at 8.
165. Addressing federal judges at a recent Federal Judicial Center workshop, Judge A. David
Mazzone of the District of Massachusetts emphasized that judges "owe it to [probation officers]
to understand and to appreciate the rather vigorous cross currents that are currently affecting the
probation service." A.D. Mazzone, Remarks at the Federal Judicial Center Workshop for Judges
of the First, Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits (April 29, 1989) (available at the Commis-
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possible, however, that probation officers will learn the futility of their attempts to override the AUSA, and will defer so heavily to the government's
assessment of facts and proof that fact manipulation of the kind we have described will become less visible.
While instances of fact manipulation were found in diverse areas of the
Guideline computation process, they seemed more frequent in situations relating to drug quantities, the presence of a weapon in a drug case, abuse of
trust, and the defendant's role in the offense. The last two categories are especially subjective, and, therefore, are especially vulnerable to manipulation.
Greater specificity of definition would not eliminate all problems, given the
techniques of manipulation used, but it might help narrow the scope of the
problem. With respect to role in the offense, the consequences of factual distortion can be severe, since the potential adjustment spans a range of eight
levels.M For example, the potential for disparity is substantial in the case of
an organizer of a complex conspiracy. The nature of the organizer's involvement is often unclear since he usually participates in the crime from a distance. In this case, a major leadership role could easily become a "minimal"
role, if viewed in a more sympathetic light as the result of a plea negotiation.
3.

Charge Bargaining

As in the case of fact bargaining, charge bargaining occurred in more than
a few cases; its potential for introducing disparity is likewise substantial. Neither the Guidelines nor Justice Department policy absolutely prohibits charge
bargaining; 167 thus, the environment inhibits the use of the charge bargaining
technique even less than it restrains the use of fact bargaining.'"6 The Justice
Department permits prosecutors to drop charges that are not "readily provable;" the Guidelines permit charge bargains as long as the remaining charges
"adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior."' 69 On the
other hand, local United States Attorney's office policies toward certain recurring charges offer more potential for developing customary rules of thumb and
possibilities for oversight than the amorphous factual assessments relating to
role in the offense, for example.
sion). In particular, Mazzone urged judges "to make it clear that you expect [probation officers]
to stand their ground in the face of unreasonable complaints from counsel and that you will stand
behind them." Id.
166. See GUIDELINES, supra note 14, §§ 3Bl.i(a), 3BI.2(a) (setting out increase of four for major "organizer or leader" and decrease of four for "minimal participant").
167. See supra notes 73 & 100 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of valid charges
under Guidelines).
168. Because the Commission is in the judicial branch, the separation of powers doctrine prevents the Commission from directly controlling charge bargaining. The Commission could eliminate charge bargaining indirectly by moving the Guidelines towards a pure real offense system.
This approach would create a number of problems. See Breyei, supra note 57, at 10-11 (noting
procedural and fairness concerns; Nagel, supra note 57, at 925 n.228 (same).
169. GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 6B1.2(a).
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To begin an assessment of the charge bargaining question, we need to distinguish charge bargains that affect the Guideline sentencing calculus from
those which do not. For example, a defendant charged with five counts of
fraud may plead guilty to the first two counts in return for dismissal of the
others. Since the Guideline sentence will be based on the total value of the
fraud, the dismissal of three counts will not have a substantial effect on the
applicable Guideline range, at least in the absence of a factual dispute relating
to these counts. Such a charge bargain has limited value to the defense, but
defense counsel apparently view such a deal as valuable, nonetheless, to the
extent that it reduces the client's theoretical maximum outer exposure or enables them to present an apparent concession to their client.
A slightly different situation can be presented in cases involving drug quantities. If a defendant is charged in two counts with selling one kilogram of
cocaine on two occasions, the case is like the previous example, and dismissal
of one of the counts is largely inconsequential. The situation changes, however, if the defendant is charged with possession with intent to distribute in
excess of five kilograms of cocaine, and pleads guilty to possession with intent
to distribute 500 grams. Here the reduction in quantities charged avoids the
ten-year statutory minimum sentence that would kick in at the five-kilogram
level. 170 Although the Guideline sentencing computation is identical, avoidance
of the statutory minimum offers substantial benefits for the defense -reductions for acceptance of responsibility and minor or minimal role become available, along with the possibility of a downward departure. Such adjustments
could bring the defendant well below the minimum mandatory sentence available in the absence of charge dismissal.
The mandatory minimums become problematic for three reasons. First, minimums that Congress considered appropriate for a major drug distributor, or
even for the "typical" case, can be disproportionate to the culpability of a
peripheral participant in a large drug conspiracy. Second, some prosecutors
choose to mitigate perceived severity by moderation in charging. Such willingness to soften the impact of mandatory minimums varied widely among offices
and prosecutors, however, and sharp sentencing disparities resulted. Third,
when the Guideline calculus would produce a much lower sentence than an
available statutory minimum, the prosecutor's discretion to invoke the mandatory minimum provided a powerful vehicle for inducing a guilty plea. That
leverage would prove especially useful if a defendant could raise plausible
claims of innocence.
Nonetheless, the dismissal of consequential mandatory minimum counts is
not impermissible under the Guidelines. The drug statutes do not forbid the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in invoking the mandatory minimums. Although the Redbook seems to forbid the dismissal of "readily provable"
charges, subsequent Justice Department directives contemplate exceptions. Following the Guidelines themselves, a calculated sentence would by hypothesis
"adequately reflect" the seriousness of the actual offense behavior, provided
170. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
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that the Guidelines factors are respected in calculating the applicable range.
The situation is quite different when charge bargaining affects the Guideline
sentencing computation. Despite the Guidelines' general focus on actual quantities and other real circumstances, there are some circumstances in which the
formal charges can make a major difference. In cases of several bank robberies, for example, unlike multiple counts of fraud, the multiple count rules lead
to enhanced punishment only for formal convictions. Thus, robbery counts
that are dismissed (and the corresponding amounts stolen) are not considered
in the sentencing calculation. Similarly, in drug cases, if the defendant is offered a plea to a conviction offense of simple possession, use of a communication facility in a drug transaction, or knowingly controlling a location where
drugs are distributed or stored, the real offense quantity enhancement tables
are inapplicable and relatively low offense levels apply. There is always the
possibility of replacing serious drug, robbery or fraud charges with some fac71
tually unrelated misdemeanor. '
Several situations of this kind have already surfaced in the case reports. In
United States v. Restrepo,'72 defendants were charged with possession with intent to distribute thirty kilos of cocaine, an offense with a ten-year minimum,
and a Guideline sentence calculated at 188 months. The defendants were allowed to plead guilty, however, to maintaining a room for the purpose of
storing a controlled substance, an offense with no mandatory minimum, and
73
The
Guideline range maximums of thirty-three to twenty-seven months.'
judge accepted the plea agreement, finding that the reduced charge "adequately reflect[s] the seriousness of the actual offense behavior" under section
6B1.2(a). 174 He then departed upward from the low Guideline ranges, finding
that these ranges did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior because it involved storage of a large quantity of drugs with
intent to sell.' 7 The result was a sentence of sixty months for each defendant,
roughly double the severity of the Guideline sentence for the offense of conviction, but only one-third the Guideline sentence for the offense originally
176
charged.
In United States v. Brodie, 77 two defendants facing mandatory minimums
of ten and fifteen years respectively for drug and weapons offenses were allowed to plead to reduced charges carrying no statutory minimum, and a
Guideline range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months. Meanwhile, a third
171. In situations where charge bargaining affects the Guideline computation, the judge may
decide to depart upwards in order to compensate for the prosecutor's charging decision and to
approach the "true" Guideline range. In this context, the judge's action is not really an "upward" departure at all.
172. 698 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
173. Id. at 564, 566.
174. Id.at 565.
175. Id. at 566-67.

176. Id.
177. 686 F. Supp. 941 (D.C. 1988).
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codefendant (Lugg), who was charged only with conspiracy, and, hence, faced
no mandatory minimum, went to trial on that charge and was convicted. As a
result, he faced a Guideline range of 210 to 262 months. Although Lugg's
actual offense behavior was less serious than that of his codefendants, his
Guideline sentence was roughly ten times longer, as a result of prosecutorial
charge bargaining.
The frequency with which charge manipulation distorts the Guidelines is impossible to assess. The charging patterns in many cases appeared straightforward and legitimate. For example, at the sites visited, no instances of armed
bank robbery cases being charged as "theft" were found. Nonetheless, in
every jurisdiction visited, some cases of troublesome charge manipulation were
found, especially in cases involving drug and weapons charges. Several examples are cited to convey the nature of the problem:
(1)A defendant present at the scene of a three-kilogram cocaine transaction
denied his involvement, and told a DEA agent at the scene that he did not
know the principals. He was charged with conspiracy to distribute - a level
twenty-eight offense - but was allowed to plead guilty to making a false
statement to a federal officer - a level six offense. The AUSA told us she
was satisfied that the defendant was not involved in the deal. We doubt that
she really believed this, since she was quite definite about wanting to ensure
that the defendant was convicted of something. She also admitted that she had
been able to get the plea to the false statement count, which by itself was
scarcely a prosecutable offense on these facts, only by threatening to prosecute
on the drug distribution charge."' The prosecutor probably believed that the
defendant was guilty of drug distribution, but her behavior would be just as
troublesome, though for different reasons, if she did not believe he was guilty.
(2) In two cases previously described, guns present at the scene of a drug
transaction were ostensibly disregarded in the guideline factor calculus because
of alleged problems of proof. 7 9 In both cases, the AUSAs agreed to drop the
corresponding weapons count under section 924(c), which carries a mandatory
five-year consecutive sentence. Although there were arguably some problems of
proof in these cases, 180 both assistants admitted that they would have pressed
the section 924(c) counts in the absence of a plea.
(3) A section 924(c) count was dropped in a case that admittedly presented
no problems of proof. The AUSA gave three reasons: the defendant agreed
not to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress; he had "cooperated"
(though not to the extent required to support a substantial assistance departure); and "He'd agreed not to take me to trial."''
178. Interview #0106 at 1-4.

179. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (detailing cases where possession of weapon
was not used in Guideline computation, although weapon was present).
180. The statute applies only if the defendant uses or carries a firearm "during and in relation
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime .

. .

. " 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (emphasis added).

This language allows the defendant to argue that a gun found at the scene of the crime had
nothing to do with the underlying offense.
181. Interview #0109 at 20.
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(4) A provision of the drug statutes specifies a sharply enhanced penalty
when an offense occurs within 1,000 feet of a school." 2 In many urban areas,
this provision can easily come into play for offenses having no relation to
school children. It is customary in some jurisdictions to charge automatically
the "schoolhouse" count where it applies. AUSA #0204 admitted that he
dropped such a count (and cut the penalties roughly in half) in order to get a
plea. His rationale was that the defendant has sold only "a few vials," and
was facing a seventeen-year sentence due to his criminal history. The prosecutor dropped the charge not only to get the plea, but to bring the sentence
more closely in line with his personal assessment of the appropriate punishment. According to the AUSA, he did not ask his supervisor to approve this
arrangement because he knew she would not.' 83
(5) Another prosecutor at site 2 dropped both a gun count and a mandatory
minimum drug charge in exchange for a defendant's proffer of assistance in
other cases. The AUSA did not want to use the section 5KI.1 substantial assistance departure provisions, because the defendant insisted on limiting his exposure up front. Contrary to office policy, the prosecutor dropped the charge,
without getting the approval of his supervisor.'"
(6) In a case handled by AUSA #0404, the defendant, originally indicted on
charges of attempted possession with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine (an offense carrying a mandatory ten-year minimum) was
allowed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit simple possession. The effect
of the plea agreement was to reduce the Guideline range from seventy-eight to
ninety-seven months down to zero to four. months, with a one-year statutory
maximum. The AUSA conceded that the reduced charge did not "adequately
reflect" the seriousness of the actual offense behavior. He attributed the sharp
reduction in the charges to two problems of proof - the defendant had a
"mere presence" defense, and there was allegedly a chain-of-custody problem
affecting the prosecutor's ability to prove the amount of drugs involved.'
In situations like those above, the decision whether to press a particular
charge has great sentencing consequences. That decision gives the prosecutor
leverage to induce a plea from an innocent defendant. It also serves, in effect,
to transfer the actual decision about the appropriate amount of punishment to
the unguided and unstructured discretion of the individual prosecutor. Difficulties of proof, together with general caseload pressures, the intensity of the individual prosecutor's desire to avoid trial, his need for assistance in other
cases, and his personal assessment of both the defendant's guilt and fair social
policy, may play more of a role in determining the punishment than the Com86
mission's Sentencing Guidelines.'
182. See supra note 139 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 856 which discuss the manufacture or
distribution of controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a school).
183. Interview #0204 at 18.
184. Interview #0204 at 14.
185. Interview #0404 at 16.
186. While charge bargaining always existed before the Guidelines, it stands out as an area of
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F. Reasons for Bargaining
The preceding sections suggest many of the reasons why bargaining occurred
- not only within the boundaries of the Guidelines, but also in contravention
of those boundaries. The principal factors that appeared to be at work are
summarized below. Since some rather broad observations are offered, we
reemphasize that we cannot at this time establish reliable estimates of frequency for the phenomena described. It seems likely that many of them occurred only in a minority of situations. Nonetheless, the factors mentioned
could represent, cumulatively, a significant source of pressure for Guideline
distortion in virtually any case.
The major reasons for bargaining include:
(1) Prosecutors focused upon maximizing their conviction rate, but were not
oriented toward maximizing the severity of the sentences they obtained. Furthermore, they resented having to try a case or go through a contested sentencing hearing, when a plea bargain would ensure "a sentence I can live
with." Their standard for what is an acceptable sentence is derived locally.
National uniformity, certainty or reduced disparity are not goals which they
embrace.
(2) Bargaining was used to reward assistance in other prosecutions. ExtraGuideline distortion of facts and charges was sometimes preferred to the
Guidelines more honest framework for departure in cases of substantial assistance, either because prosecutors wished to reward a desire to cooperate that
would not have risen to the level of substantial assistance under section 5K1.1,
or because they wanted more certainty than the section 5KlI. procedure allows.
(3) The acceptance of responsibility discount was perceived as an inadequate
inducement for the defense to waive trial.
(4) In weak cases, prosecutors wanted to ensure conviction on at least one
charge, but the Guidelines do not recognize "problems of proof" as a legitimate reason for reducing the offense severity level. Nor, presumably, would
8 7
such problems have provided a legitimate ground for a downward departure.
(5) Prosecutors viewed some Guideline sentences as too severe. They granted
sentencing concessions not because they were obligated to do so in this bargaining situation, but because of their own sense of the equities - equities

concern in a regime of sentencing reform aimed at reducing disparity and increasing certainty in
sentencing. Importantly, the Guidelines did not create the problem of prosecutorial discretion. The
problem only seems more incongruous now, especially since Congress has restricted judicial discretion. Because Congress chose to direct its attention to judges and not prosecutors, the former
have experienced some understandable frustration under the Guidelines system. This is especially
true with respect to those portions of the Guidelines that are driven more by a conviction charge
offense theory than a real offense theory (bank robbery, for example). See infra note 168 (Guideline § 6B1.2(a)).
187. See, e.g., Interview #0301 at 9 (proof problems not viewed as reason for downward departure under Guidelines).
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which may partly reflect the likely sentence in their jurisdiction before the

Guidelines."8
(6) There were a variety of more elusive and partially interrelated reasons
why prosecutors reportedly offered additional inducements to avoid trial:
(a) Caseload pressures in the office;8 9
(b) A desire to preserve credibility with the judge;' 90
(c) A desire not to irritate the judge; 91 and
(d) A desire to avoid trial for personal reasons. 9 2
It is too soon to assess the policy implications of the various views just
described, especially since the prevalence of such views is unknown. In any
event, some of them may be a product of familiarity with previous ways of
doing business, and may, therefore, gradually change as Guideline experience
accumulates. Other views (especially those related to substantial assistance and
acceptance of responsibility) seem to reflect misunderstandings about how the
Guidelines are supposed to work. In this area, training and experience may
change perceptions, or the Guidelines themselves may require either clarification or substantive change. Finally, many of the perceptions raise complex
policy dilemmas that will not diminish with time or incremental Guideline revision. Particularly worth mention in this regard are the views related to case
pressure, weak cases and punishment severity levels.
G.

Summary of Research Findings

Seven salient points emerge from our preliminary research:
First, even during the pre-Mistretta period, there was a considerable degree
of compliance with Guideline requirements in guilty plea cases. The result was
188. See, e.g., Interview #0105 at 10 (bargains often determined by pre-Guideline sentences in
district); Interview #0204 at 6 (same); Interview #0307 at 4 (same).
189. "[Tlhose boys are swamped now. They have not got time to fool around. That has always
been in my mind a legitimate reason for a reduction - *when you just don't have the time."
Interview 04
at 3. "[M]ost assistants feel strongly, whether they say it or not, that they have
too much work to take a case like this [defendant sold "two bottles" of crack] to trial and they
will be damned if they will let the Guidelines force a case like this to trial. So that's what leads
[Hiere we do a certain amount of 'triage'. . . . I think all U.S. Attorney
to subversion ....
offices do." Interview #0204 at 5, 13; see generally Interview #0301 at 9.
190. "You don't try your bad case and plead your good ones .-... If you keep bringing raggedy cases like that before the judge, maybe he can't tell the difference between a raggedy case
and a good one next time." Interview #0404 at 18; see generally Interview #0405 at 14.
191. In minor drug cases, such as street-level sales by small dealers, "[y]ou have the occasional
trial, which infuriates the judges. They would be mad at us for reasons I don't understand. 'It is
still a crime, your Honor, for God's sakes - it's a federal crime.' " Interview #0204 at 13.
192. Despite protestations that "I came here to try cases," or "I love to try cases," some
prosecutors really did not want to try most cases. Prosecutors resented having to try simple cases,
but they also wanted to avoid wasting time and resources (theirs, their office's and the court's) in
trying cases that are complex. They had little enthusiasm for trying a case involving a delicate
problem of proof.
One AUSA explained an unusually attractive extra-Guideline plea offer in part on the basis that
"I didn't want him to take me to trial." Interview #0109 at 20 (emphasis added).
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usually systematic, uniform sentencing based on a fair assessment of the real
facts and charges.
Second, even in cases of full Guideline compliance, inappropriate disparity
sometimes resulted. Such disparity was partly a function of ambiguity in the
language of the Guidelines and policy statements, especially the requirements
that plea agreement departures be supported by "justifiable reasons" and that
remaining charges "adequately reflect" actual offense seriousness. Significant
disparity resulted from inconsistent practice with respect to awarding the acceptance of responsibility discount and initiating the departure mechanism in
cases of substantial assistance. This phenomenon will have to be studied, in
more jurisdictions, during the post-Mistretta period.
Third, there is little doubt that there was some degree of Guideline evasion,
with sentences based on a distorted or artificial version of the facts and
charges. We are not in a position to estimate the frequency of this phenomenon. While it most likely did not exist in most guilty plea cases, such evasion
probably occurred in a significant minority of the cases. The patterns of
Guideline circumvention described existed at all the research sites, and happened in an array of cases.
Fourth, Guideline circumvention took three principal forms: charge bargaining, date bargaining and Guideline factor bargaining.
Fifth, the principal sources of pressure for Guideline circumvention seemed
to be: (1) perceived inadequacies in the substantial assistance departure mechanism and in the acceptance of responsibility discount; (2) a perception among
attorneys trained in investigation and trial techniques that sentencing is not a
prosecutorial function, or that their sentencing role (like their charging role) is
not fully adversarial, resulting in commitment to the prosecutor's own conception of a fair sentence rather than to full enforcement of the law; (3) substantive dissatisfaction on the part of prosecutors (with the encouragement or
acquiescence of judges) with Guideline sentences perceived as too severe or not
worth the extra effort to negotiate or mete out; (4) a genuine lack of interest
on the part of prosecutors in uniformity, certainty or reduction of disparity;
(5) the lack of a Guideline vehicle for considering case pressures and proof
problems as a justification for sentencing concessions; and (6) miscellaneous
personal and environmental pressures to avoid trial.
Sixth, the mechanisms for preventing and exposing Guideline circumvention
are incomplete and often ineffective. Some United States Attorneys offices
consciously delegated great independence to trial assistants or had only informal, largely ineffective procedures for supervision and review. Probation officers were dependent on prosecutors not only for providing essential historical
facts, but also for supporting the officer's appraisal of the legal significance
of facts in the file. Although probation officers often succeeded in "keeping
the system honest," they sometimes reported feeling isolated and unsupported.
Judicial attitudes could reinforce this problem. Judges, on whom the Guidelines rely as the ultimate guarantors of "truth-in-sentencing," sometimes acquiesced to Guideline evasion. Far from encouraging diligent skepticism on the
part of the probation officers, judges may have failed to support the officer
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or even discouraged his or her efforts in an attempt to moderate a sentence
that was more severe than was given in the past or thought necessary, or to
save a plea agreement and avoid the risk of a trial.
The seventh and last point emerges from the previous ones, and can serve
as our principal conclusion. The Guideline system has taken a large step toward controlling disparity in guilty plea cases; its ambitious efforts, far exceeding anything attempted in previous sentencing reform initiatives, have
already begun to bear fruit. Nonetheless, the regulatory system contains weaknesses and some potentially large holes. These shortcomings, should they continue in the post-Mistretta period, pose a potential threat to the ultimate
success of the Guidelines reform effort.
V.

FuTURE PROSPECTS

This Article unfortunately must align itself with that frustrating genre which
ends with a call for more research. We have identified certain potential problem areas and some common patterns of behavior. We do not know to what
extent the phenomena we encountered in the pre-Mistretta period will be permanent or widespread. With this caveat in mind, several areas that are likely
to deserve special attention in any consideration of remedies for problems we
have addressed can be mentioned.
Rewards to defendants who provide substantial assistance in other prosecutions could be structured to provide more uniform standards, both in terms of
the assistance sufficient to qualify, and the extent of the appropriate reward.
Such standards could be promulgated by each United States Attorney office,
the Justice Department, the Commission, or some combination of the three.
Apart from standards applicable across the board, the departure mechanism
may need alteration to afford each side some certainty about what the reward
will be in any given case.
The acceptance of responsibility concept may need to be restructured. If understood to require true contrition prior to apprehension or very early in the
prosecution, few defendants can qualify even among those who plead guilty.
On the other hand, if very early expressions of remorse are not essential,
many defendants will be eligible even after conviction at trial. In either event,
the acceptance of responsibility concept may not provide a sufficient basis for
distinguishing the defendant who pleads guilty from the one who does not.
Does the concept include any sentence discount to reward the defendant because he has saved society the expense of trial? Divergent interpretations of
the acceptance of responsibility provision may virtually guarantee disparity, at
least to the extent of the two-level adjustment. If the Guidelines are clarified
to reinforce the present provision's implication that there is no discount for
the guilty plea alone, then pressure to find such a discount elsewhere may
continue. One prosecutor stated:
[It's not fair for someone who pleads guilty and saves the government the expense of trial and the possibility that you might not win
-it's not fair for that person to get the same two points as the
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person who makes the government show their proof, goes through a
trial, comes out and then finally at sentencing says, "Golly gee, I'm
sorry for this." That's not fair. 93
For present purposes, we need not not accept or reject this view. We merely
suggest that the Commission could either accommodate it, or find a way to
address it. The Commission could then either alter the discount or control the
kind of sentiment it reflects.
Even if the "acceptance" discount implies some guilty plea inducement, case
pressure is certainly not a legitimate ground for an additional offense level
reduction under the present Guidelines. Nor would case pressure justify a
judge in accepting a plea to a charge that does not "adequately reflect the
seriousness of the actual offense behavior."'9 Nonetheless, under pre-Guideline
practice, some attorneys and judges seemed to give this consideration great
weight. Indeed, the Thornburgh memorandum expressly grants Justice Department approval of the practice of charge manipulation in response to case pressure concerns.' 95
The case pressure variable, as evaluated by individual prosecutors, contains
almost unbounded potential for perpetuating sentence disparities. If the Commission remains committed to preventing case pressure distortion, a large project of reaffirmation and education lies ahead. If instead the Commission is
persuaded that some concession to current practice is warranted, it will face
the daunting task of finding a way to structure prosecutorial responses to case
pressure considerations.
Much of what has been said about the case pressure dilemma applies as well
to the question of proof problems. The Guidelines do not permit sentencing
concessions due to evidentiary problems, but many attorneys and judges have
long taken that practice for granted in plea bargaining. Again, the potential
for disparity is clear. Although few cases that reach the indictment stage are
seriously weak, existing custom and Justice Department policy sanction concessions not only in truly weak cases, but also whenever the case is not "readily
provable."'' 9 The category for negotiation, therefore, encompasses not just
weak cases but any cases that are not strong.
An exception for "non-ironclad" cases is enormously consequential. Problems of proof are probably more the rule than the exception, and an imaginative attorney can probably find a way to take almost any case out of the
Justice Department's "readily provable" category. Once this happens, the
prosecutor is free to negotiate on the basis of his individual conception of an
equitable sentence, without regard to Guideline principles. As with the case
193. Interview #0302 at 7.
194. GuiDELINES, supra note 14, § 6B1.2(a).

195. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 94, at 4 ("approval to drop charges in a particular
case might be given because the United States Attorney's office is particularly overburdened, the
case would be time-consuming to try, and proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the total
number of cases disposed of by the office").
196. REDBOOK, supra note 94, at 46-7.
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pressure question, the Commission will face operational difficulties regardless
of whether it seeks to modify current practice, or to accommodate the practice
and bring it under control. The substantive implications of either choice are
complex and controversial, touching on the propriety of compromise, the need
to facilitate conviction of the guilty, the threat to the constitutional rights to
trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the serious risks of convicting the innocent.
Finally, the Commission cannot escape, and hopefully will never wish to escape, the substantive question of appropriate severity. What punishment is
fair, just and effective for offense categories and for individual cases? The
issue is not only of obvious importance in its own right, but it seems intimately connected to the goals of uniform sentencing and consistency in the
guilty plea process. Especially in drug cases, where statutory changes require
punishment levels more severe than past practice in much of the country, the
Commission can draw on experience from the field to identify the kinds of
equities which must play a role in setting appropriate severity levels and in
carving out situations for which less severe treatment may be warranted.
While it is too early to pronounce the Commission's efforts in the guilty
plea area a success, continued attention to the problems we have canvassed
could provide a basis for shoring up the potential weaknesses. Unwarranted
disparities in guilty plea sentencing could continue, but they can be brought
under control if their dynamics are continuously monitored, understood and
addressed in depth by an active, reflective Commission.

